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Abstract 
 
This dissertation contributes to the academic literature by examining two issues in relation to 
corporate Internet disclosure. First, we make a detailed content analysis of the investor 
relation section on the Web sites of US companies to gain insight into the type and amount of 
information provided to investors on corporate Web sites and to establish a measure of the 
Internet disclosure level. We find that companies are not exploiting the full potential of this 
disclosure medium. In a second study, we examine the relation between the cost of equity 
capital and the disclosure level of information in the investor relation section of corporate 
Web sites. We regress the cost of equity capital, obtained from a comprehensive discounted 
cash flow model, on the disclosure measure from the content analysis study to examine the 
relationship between these two variables. For a cross-sectional sample of 141 non-financial 
US companies, we find a negative and highly significant association between the cost of 
equity capital and level of Internet investor relation disclosure. The results remain significant 
after controlling for potentially influential variables such as different risk characteristics and 
firm size.  The results indicate thus that Internet disclosure is useful to investors. 
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1. Introduction 
In this dissertation, we examine two issues related to corporate Internet disclosure in two 
different studies. In the first study, we want to gain insight into the type and amount of 
information available to investors on corporate Web sites.  In a second study, we examine the 
potential relationship between the cost of equity capital and the disclosure level of the 
investor relation section. According to Verrecchia (2001), FASB (2000) and AICPA (1994) 
there still is a demand for empirical work examining the economical consequences of 
disclosure. Even though many studies on disclosure already exist, there is “limited evidence 
regarding the market impact of broadly disseminating disclosures” (Bushee et al., 2003) and 
to our knowledge no prior published study examines the relationship between disclosure in 
the investor relation section on corporate Web sites and the cost of equity capital. Empirical 
research on the subject is still focused on the traditional ways of disclosure such as the annual 
report (Hossain, Tan, and Adams 1994; Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002). The modern way of 
disclosure to investors over the Internet is still relatively little researched but increasingly 
important. The IASC (1999) even states that: “… in our view, it is likely that in the next five 
years or so, business reporting to stakeholders will move almost entirely from the current 
primarily print-based mode to using the Web as the primary information dissemination 
channel, with the print-based mode as secondary channel.”  
 
With this thesis, we contribute in two ways to the academic empirical disclosure literature. 
First, we make an investor relation Web site content analysis to examine the type and amount 
of information that companies provide to investors on their Web sites. In a second research, 
we examine the usefulness of this information by empirically testing the impact of the 
investor relation Web site disclosure level on a company’s cost of equity capital. Only when 
investor relation Web site disclosure is useful in some way to investors, we should find a 
significant relationship between the cost of equity capital and the investor relation Web site 
disclosure level.  
Economic theory suggests a negative association between disclosure level and the cost of 
equity capital. Empirical work however is confronted with major methodological difficulties: 
neither the disclosure level nor the cost of equity capital can be observed easily and finding a 
reliable measure for both variables is difficult. The results of many prior studies on the 
subject are therefore mixed, depending on the different disclosure metrics and various ways 
of estimating the cost of equity capital.  
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In this dissertation, we adopt a comprehensive version of the discounted cash flow (DCF) 
valuation model to estimate the cost of equity capital and create our own disclosure measure 
based on disclosure in the investor relation section of corporate Web sites. Using a regression 
model, we provide evidence on the nature and magnitude of the relationship between a firm’s 
investor relation Web sites disclosure level and its cost of equity capital. For a cross-sectional 
sample of 141 non-financial US firms, we find a negative and highly significant association 
between the two variables. These results indicate that information on corporate Web sites is 
indeed useful to investors. Companies that have higher Internet disclosure levels in our 
sample, have significantly lower cost of equity capital. 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter two, we present a 
comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical disclosure literature to show the 
complex role of disclosure in financial markets. In the third chapter, we conduct an investor 
relation Web site content analysis of 154 non-financial companies to gain insight into the 
type and amount of disclosure on corporate Web sites and to establish a measure of Internet 
disclosure level. In chapter four, we estimate the cost of equity capital for the same sample 
using a comprehensive version of the discounted cash flow model and regress it on our 
disclosure measure to examine the empirical relationship between the cost of equity capital 
and the Internet disclosure level. Finally, in chapter five we summarize the results and 
provide explanations as well as recommendations for future research.  
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2. Comprehensive Review of the Disclosure Literature 
Disclosure or corporate reporting is the process of providing information from the reporting 
company to the financial markets.1 In its simplest form, disclosure is a method of 
communication between the reporting company and the interested users of the reported 
information. Users include current and potential small and institutional investors, financial 
analysts and other capital market participants who have an interest in the value of a firm. In 
an efficient market, firm value is defined as the present value of expected future net cash 
flows, discounted at the appropriate risk-adjusted rate of return (Kothari, 2001). The 
objective of disclosure is therefore to provide information useful to investors in “assessing 
the amounts, timing, and uncertainty” of future cash flows.2 Useful information improves 
decision making by investors and other users of a firm’s disclosure leading to a better 
allocation of resources in the economy. Disclosure is therefore essential for the well 
prospering of financial markets (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) and for the optimal allocation 
of savings to investment opportunities in the economy (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
 
Today, firms inform investors by providing regulated financial reports, including the financial 
statements, footnotes, management discussions and analysis (MD&A) and other regulatory 
filings. Additionally, some firms provide voluntary disclosure such as release of earnings 
forecasts by management, conference calls, press releases, investor presentations, Internet 
Web sites, and other information such as voluntary disclosure in annual reports and required 
SEC filings. Finally, also information intermediaries such as financial analysts, industry 
experts and the financial press provide information to investors.  
Investors need information from the company because management has superior knowledge 
compared to outside investors on their firm’s current and future performance (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b). This superior information arises from the 
separation of ownership and control in modern corporations (Berle and Means, 1932). The 
separation of ownership and control is the basis for agency theory and, derived from that, 
information asymmetry. Both are very important issues in relation to disclosure. 
                                                 
1
 The Accounting Standards Steering Committee (ASSC) defines Corporate Reporting as the process of 
communicating information (both financial and non-financial) about the resources and performance of the 
reporting entity (ASSC, 1975) 
2
 FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts, No. 1, 1978 
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Agency theory argues that there is a potential conflict of interest between managers and 
investors due to the separation of ownership from control (Brealey and Myers, 2000). 
Investors (the principals) typically do not take part in the daily operations of the firm; they 
leave this responsibility to management (the agents). The different roles of principals and 
agents create an agency problem when both management and investors maximize their own 
utility and have conflicting incentives. Such conflicting incentives can induce management to 
act against the interest of investors and therefore falsifying or withholding information. This 
leads to an information problem between insiders and outsiders of the firm known as 
information asymmetry.  
 
Information asymmetry is a serious problem that may disturb the functioning of the capital 
markets leading even to their partial or complete breakdown (Akerlof, 1970). In lack of 
proper information, investors will provide only economically suboptimal financial resources, 
if anything, to an investment opportunity. This distorts the optimal allocation of savings to 
investment opportunities.  
The information problem cannot be solved completely by privately collecting and analyzing 
data since the private gathering of additional information is costly, it is undertaken only by 
investors that have the required resources (time, money and knowledge) and that expect a 
positive payoff (benefits > costs). The existence of better-informed investors leads 
furthermore to an adverse selection problem in transactions between stock buyers and sellers. 
The recognition of this problem could move away uninformed investors from the stock 
market because they would trade at a disadvantage compared to the informed investors. The 
result is lower trading volume, higher transaction costs, and market illiquidity or even 
complete market breakdowns (Lev, 1988).  
For these reasons, the reduction of information asymmetry is in the interest of the firm to 
ensure continuous access to capital from financial markets. According to Myers and Majluf 
(1984) firms’ public equity or debt offers would be too expensive for existing shareholders if 
firms would not reduce the information asymmetry problem. This would result in a 
suboptimal allocation of capital and lower economic growth. 
Corporations as well as the government have therefore adopted various mechanisms to 
diminish the economic effects of information asymmetry. The main solutions to the 
information asymmetry problem proposed in the literature are (1) optimal contracts between 
management and investors and (2) disclosure (mandatory and voluntary). 
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Optimal contracts between managers and investors help to reduce the agency problem and 
therefore indirectly the information asymmetry problem. Healy and Palepu (2001) review the 
optimal contracts literature, so we refrain from reviewing this issue and will focus on the 
second solution, disclosure. 
Disclosure, whether mandated or voluntary, reduces information asymmetry by equalizing 
not only the knowledge between investors and management but also between different groups 
of investors. Disclosure however reduces information asymmetry only when it is useful. In 
the accounting literature five main characteristics are viewed as desirable for the fulfillment 
of the usefulness of information: relevance, reliability, comparability, timeliness and 
understandability.3   
First, to be useful, information must be relevant to investors. Information is relevant when it 
influences the economic decisions investors make by helping them to evaluate the past, 
presence and future of the business and its environment (IASC, 2000). Second, information 
must be reliable to be useful. To be reliable, information must be complete within the bounds 
of materiality and cost. Omitting important facts can cause information to be false or 
misleading and therefore unreliable (IASC, 2000). Furthermore, to be reliable information 
must be credible and objective, that is, free from bias. Information is not objective if, by 
selection or presentation of information, management influences investors in order to achieve 
a desirable outcome (IASC, 2000). Third, to be useful information must be comparable. 
Information is comparable when it allows comparison over time (intra-company 
comparability) and between companies (inter-company comparability). Forth, information 
must be timely, delivered to the users as quickly as possible. In a fast changing business 
environment, the timeliest information has the most value and information should therefore 
be distributed to all users in the fastest possible way to reduce information asymmetry. 
Relevance, reliability, comparability and timeliness of information are still not enough to 
fulfill the criteria of usefulness. Information must be also presented in an understandable way 
to be useful (IASC, 2000). The presentation of information must be understandable for the 
users and thus reflect substance over form. In other words, it is not enough only to present 
numbers. The numbers itself, of course, are important but the meaning of numbers must be 
clear. Therefore, explanations or methods of calculations are needed as well.  
 
                                                 
3
 e.g. ICAEW (1975), FASB (1980), AICPA (1994), IAS (2000). 
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Even though all criteria of usefulness are important, the two most important criteria are 
relevance and reliability (IASC, 2000 and AICPA, 1994). Relevance and reliability indirectly 
include the other criteria mentioned above. Timeliness and comparability, for example, could 
be viewed as a sub-criterion for relevance. This means that information in order to be useful 
for investors in estimating a company’s future cash flows must first of all be relevant and 
reliable.  
Several studies, as well as the recent accounting scandals show that this is however not 
always the case. DiPiazza and Eccles (2002) find for example that corporate information is 
not complete and Watts and Zimmerman (1981) that information is not always objective and 
thus not necessarily reliable. Furthermore, Ball and Brown (1968) already showed in 1968 
that information is not always timely and therefore might not be very relevant to investors; 
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) conclude the same in a more recent study.  
Empirical research suggests however not only that financial disclosure is not very relevant, 
but that the relevance of accounting numbers has decreased significantly over time (Chang, 
1998, Lev and Zarowin, 1999). These studies show that in the US the relations between stock 
prices, earnings and book values have deteriorated so that today earnings explain only about 
5% of stock returns (Lev and Zarowin, 1999). Chang (1998) argues that the partial 
explanation of the decline in value relevance of financial statement information is the change 
of the economic environment. Economically relevant items such as research and development 
costs, brands, and other intangible assets are often expensed or ignored because their 
measurement is not sufficiently reliable. Also the reliability of estimates and other relevant 
forward-looking information in financial reports is a big concern. The former SEC Chairman 
Levitt expressed concerns that companies use different accounting methods to manage 
earnings (Levitt, 1998). The solution that he proposed was to further reduce the discretion 
companies have in accounting choices. However, according to Lundholm (1999) reducing 
accounting discretion may improve the reliability of estimates and other forward-looking 
information but could further reduce the relevance of financial reports by hindering 
management’s ability to communicate private information through accounting choices.  
Furthermore, practitioners observed in recent years an increasing gap between information 
disclosed by companies and the information needs of investors. In response have AICPA 
(1994), FASB (2001) and others been looking for ways to improve the quality of disclosure 
by making it more useful to investors. Their recommendations are consistent with each other. 
In particular, these studies conclude that users of financial information need (1) more 
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disclosure of non-financial information, (2) more forward-looking information and (3) more 
information about intangible assets. 
These suggested improvements would increase the relevance of current information. The 
higher relevance must however be weighted against a possible decrease in reliability. 
Generally, there are three ways to increase reliability of disclosure: (1) ethics, (2) corporate 
governance and (3) regulations.  
 
Ethics 
One important way to increase reliability of information is the enforcement of ethical 
behavior within the reporting corporation. Webster's dictionary defines ethics as “the study of 
standards of conduct and moral judgment; the systematic study of the principles and methods 
for distinguishing right from wrong, and good from bad” (Webster, 1970). Ethics is a 
fundamental business concept and every profession develops a body of such principles and 
standards (Greenwood, 1978) which assist individuals when they face ethical dilemmas and 
problems of ‘weakness of will’.  
The recent accounting scandals and fraud convictions putting several executives behind bars 
showed that ethical behavior is not self-evident. Ethics is a personal matter and personal 
values may influence decision making in organizations. The potential link between personal 
values and managerial decision making has been recognized for many years (e.g. Learned et 
al., 1959; England, 1967). However, several recent studies have failed to provide support for 
the effects of personal values on ethical decisions in business (e.g. Akaah and Lund, 1994). 
This suggests that even people with strong personal values may act unethical because of 
improper incentives and the pressure of others. For this reason, rules and regulations must be 
established. Such rules are manifested in corporate governance principles.  
 
Corporate Governance 
According to the Cadbury report (Cadbury Committee, 1992) corporate governance is “the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled”. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) write 
that “corporate governance deals with the way in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”. Without going further into the role 
of corporate governance, it could be said that corporate governance is an important 
mechanism to enforce management to act in interest of shareholders and to solve the 
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problems arising from the separation of ownership and control, e.g. the agency problem and 
information asymmetry.  
 
There are two organs of corporate governance that help to solve these problems: the board of 
directors as representatives of the shareholders, and auditors as external controllers of 
management. One of the responsibilities of the board of directors is supervising management 
to ensure shareholder value maximization and fair reporting to shareholders about the actual 
corporate situation.  
The second organ to mitigate the separation of ownership and control is the audit. Before 
financial information is disclosed, independent auditors provide an external and objective 
check of the financial statements. Investors require an independent auditor because they 
mistrust management when it comes down to disclosing truthful reports on their own. An 
independent audit increases therefore the reliability of the disclosed information to investors. 
According to Leftwich (1983) even when it is not required by regulation, investors demand 
an independent auditor as a condition of financing. This finding shows that having an 
independent auditor is important to investors in enhancing disclosure credibility.  
Another mechanism build into the audit function to increase the credibility of disclosures, 
especially if the audit fails, is the possibility of litigation (Verrecchia, 2001). If audit 
disclosure turns out to be false, the investor can sue the auditor to reclaim losses.  Large audit 
firms are perceived to have "deep pockets" (Kothari et al., 1988) and therefore are their audit 
opinions like insurance guarantees that the financial statements are not falsified (Skinner, 
1994). Theoretically, the risk of litigation should be a motivation to the audit firm to require 
truthful corporate information and thus making it more reliable. 
On the other hand, Watts and Zimmerman (1981) hypothesize that auditors act in the interest 
of the managers that hire them, rather than in the interest of the investors and Healy and 
Palepu (2001) find little empirical evidence that auditors enhance the credibility of financial 
reports and question the advantages of having audits. According to Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1996) are large audit firms only slightly successful in discovering illegal earnings 
management and auditors in the year 2000 were less likely to issue warnings about possible 
bankruptcy situations than they were in 1992 (Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002). Considering 
the recent huge audit failures, the collapse of the Arthur Andersen, one of the Big Five audit 
firms, and the independence problems of accountants who provide both audit and consulting 
services to the same client indicate that accountants may have lost the moral right to conduct 
 10 
audits (Dunn and Adamson, 2003). This development recently led to an increased use of the 
third possible solution to increase the reliability of information: regulation. 
 
Regulation 
Agency theory suggests that management acts in its own interest rather than in the interest of 
investors as the legal owners of the company. This creates a demand for the protection of 
shareholder and creditor interests against dishonest actions of management. By creating 
minimum disclosure requirements, regulators reduce the information asymmetry between 
informed and uninformed investors and therefore create this protection (Healy and Palepu, 
2001).   
New corporate disclosure rules are usually suggested after large stock market declines and 
broadly viewed corporate scandals (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979). Although many advocate 
this kind of behavior, the economic consequences of required disclosures are not obvious. 
Sunder (2002) suggests that competition and private incentives might be more efficient in 
their outcomes than regulation. Theoretically, firms have incentives to provide information 
voluntarily because they eventually suffer cost of withholding it. On the other hand, 
disclosure is costly and therefore corporations may withhold some information (Verrecchia, 
1983; Darrough and Stoughton, 1990). Verrecchia (1983) relates to the cost of disclosing 
information as “proprietary” costs. Proprietary costs include the direct cost of preparing and 
disseminating information and the costs associated with disclosing information that may be 
proprietary meaning potentially harmful to the firm if reported. Such costs are the costs of 
litigation due to disclosure and the costs of competitive disadvantage including adverse 
actions by competing firms, the entry of new firms into the industry or political costs arising 
from possible threat of regulation and antitrust investigations.  
Even though the issue is of great importance, there is still little empirical evidence on the 
possible costs and benefits of disclosure regulation in the academic literature. The basic 
questions about the demand for and effectiveness of disclosure regulation remain unanswered 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). Nevertheless always new regulations are being passed. In 2000, 
the SEC introduced Regulation FD aimed at ensuring “fair disclosure” and later in 2002 the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by the Congress of the United States.  
Regulation Fair Disclosure or simply Reg. FD was introduced on October 23, 2000. It 
requires firms to provide all material information to all investors at the same time. The goal 
of the SEC for Reg. FD was the elimination of selective disclosure to certain preferred 
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analysts and institutional shareholders before disclosing the same information to the general 
public.  
The introduction of regulation FD provided also an interesting field for academic research on 
the effects of disclosure regulation on the stock market. One result of these studies is that 
managements’ concern of higher stock return volatility due to Reg. FD could not be 
empirically verified. For example, there has been no change in returns volatility around 
earnings announcements post Reg. FD (Bailey et al., 2003; Eleswarapu et al., 2003). There 
are mixed findings regarding analyst forecast dispersion and accuracy post-FD with e.g. 
Heflin et al., (2003) finding no evidence of lower analyst accuracy and increased dispersion 
while Irani and Karamanou (2003) document an increase in forecast dispersion and a 
decrease in analyst following after the passage of Reg FD. Mohanram and Sunder (2002) find 
lower analyst accuracy and increased dispersion. Furthermore, they find that analysts with 
superior forecast accuracy in the pre-FD period were unable to maintain their advantage post-
FD. This indicates a convergence in performance among analysts and suggests an increase in 
fairness post-FD.  
Those results support the SEC’s stated objectives for Reg. FD to level the playing field 
among analysts and to enhance analyst independence. The fears expressed by the analyst 
industry association that Reg. FD would negatively impact analysts’ information gathering or 
the fear that companies might disclose less are not supported empirically. There has even 
been an increase in some types of disclosure. Both Heflin et al. (2003) and Cotter et al., 
(2002) find that the frequency of management earnings forecasts have increased and Straser 
(2002) finds increases in various disclosure types including SEC filings and press releases. 
 
Another major change after Reg. FD was the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. 
The goal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is to “protect investors by improving the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures” (U.S. House, 2002). The act also contains some important 
sections referring to internal control of public corporations. Sarbanes-Oxley introduced 
among others new responsibilities for the CEO and CFO and the audit committee. For 
example, a company's CEO and CFO are now required to certify each quarterly and annual 
report. In case of false certifications, major criminal penalties are foreseen to keep disclosure 
controls and procedures sufficient in order to secure the financial and non-financial 
information required to be disclosed in SEC reports. From now on management will not only 
be asked to admit its responsibility for having an adequate inner control structure, but also 
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needs to evaluate the effectiveness of that structure and publicly report on that evaluation. 
The company’s independent auditors are required to attest and report on management's 
evaluation.   
 
While ethics, corporate governance and regulations all seem to contribute to the usefulness of 
reported information, companies can further enhance the quality of their disclosure with 
voluntary information.  
 
Voluntary Disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure includes the release of earnings forecasts by management, presentations 
to the public, investor relation disclosure, Internet Web sites, press releases, conference calls, 
voluntary information in the annual report and required SEC filings, as well as corporate 
finance policies that can be used for signaling purposes.  
The theoretical literature shows that voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetry 
among informed and uninformed market participants (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). The 
extent to which voluntary disclosure decreases information asymmetry depends on the degree 
of usefulness of this information. Credibility and thus reliability is the major concern in the 
usefulness of voluntary provided information. Due to the fact that managers have incentives 
to make self-serving voluntary disclosures, it is unclear whether voluntary disclosure is 
credible (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Concerns expressed by the SEC show that voluntary 
disclosure may not be credible. Before 1973, the disclosure of forecasts in SEC fillings was 
prohibited due to concerns that forecasts were manipulated by management and thus not 
credible (How and Yeo, 2000).  
Hutton et al. (2003) argue that managers can increase the credibility of their earnings 
forecasts by providing additional information like qualitative “soft talk” disclosures or 
verifiable forward-looking statements about earnings. Credibility also increases by attracting 
analyst coverage because analysts indirectly certify voluntary disclosures and pass the 
information on to investors.  
Whether voluntary disclosure is indeed credible and therefore useful is an empirical question. 
Existing studies suggest that managers voluntarily disclose information to (1) reduce agency 
costs and lower information asymmetry, (2) improve stock liquidity, (3) increase information 
intermediation, (4) reduce the cost of capital and enhance the value of the firm, and (5) 
manipulate the markets. 
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(1) Voluntary disclosure, information asymmetry and agency costs 
Some studies have investigated the role of voluntary disclosure in reducing information 
asymmetries.  Leuz and Verrecchia (2000), Welker (1995) and Healy, Hutton and Palepu 
(1999) find that information asymmetry, as measured by the bid-ask spread, is reduced as the 
level of disclosure rises. Other studies examine the behavior of trading volume and stock 
volatility (e.g. Auer, 1998; Frankel et al., 1999) to determine whether voluntary information 
is informative for investors and thus capable of reducing information asymmetry. Auer 
(1998), for example, examines changes in share price volatility and the firm’s beta factor for 
Swiss firms that have switched to international accounting standards (IAS) and finds a small, 
but insignificant reduction in volatility and no change in beta factor. Froidevaux (2001) 
examining also Swiss firms finds that a higher level of disclosure and a better investor 
relation policy reduces price volatility. Frankel, Johnson, and Skinner (1999) and Bushee, 
Matsumoto, and Miller (2003) find that conference calls provide important information as 
shown by abnormally high trading volume and return volatility during the conference call.  
Lang and Lundholm (1993) report that disclosure levels are higher for firms with weaker 
earnings-return relations. They use the correlation between earnings and returns as a measure 
of information asymmetry; a weak correlation between earnings and returns indicates that 
little information about firm value is captured by the mandatory earnings disclosure, so that 
information asymmetry is high for these firms. Managers reduce this information asymmetry 
by increasing voluntary disclosure. 
 
The above studies show that voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetry between 
management and investors. A decrease in information asymmetry helps to reduce the agency 
costs because if everyone would have similar information, the principal-agent problem would 
be easier to resolve (Brealey and Myers, 2000). 
Theory suggests that disclosure increases with increasing agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Empirical studies on voluntary disclosure and the agency framework show however 
mixed results. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) find no significant relationship between 
leverage (a proxy for agency costs) and financial disclosure in annual reports while Malone, 
Fries and Jones (1993) find a significant relationship between the two variables. Low (1996) 
finds a negative relationship between disclosure and agency cost proxies such as managerial 
ownership and investment opportunities and a positive relationship between disclosure and 
leverage. 
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(2) Voluntary disclosure and liquidity 
A general finding of the above studies is that disclosure reduces information asymmetries 
between management and investors. This in theory should increase the liquidity of the stock 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Firms with high levels of disclosure are likely to attract 
more investors because they can be confident that stock transactions occur at “fair” prices. 
Welker (1995) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) provide empirical evidence consistent with 
this theory. Their findings reveal that market liquidity, measured by trading volume, 
increases as the level of disclosure is increased. Other studies also show that greater 
disclosure enhances stock market liquidity (e.g. Glosten and Milgton, 1985; Diamond and 
Verrecchia, 1991; Healy, Hutton and Palepu, 1999).  
Frost et al. (2002) examine the association between disclosure and market liquidity at 
different stock exchanges. They find strong confirmation of the hypothesis that the strength 
of the disclosure system (disclosure rules, monitoring and enforcement, information 
dissemination) is positively associated with market liquidity, after controlling for stock 
exchange size, legal system and several other proxies for the extent of market development 
and the information environment. 
 
(3) Voluntary disclosure and information intermediation 
The studies reviewed until now show that increased voluntary disclosure reduces information 
asymmetries between management and investors what, in turn, improves liquidity of a firm’s 
stock. Increased liquidity should make the stock more attractive to institutional investors 
what should lead to increased information intermediation.  
The effect of voluntary disclosure on information intermediation is however not obvious. On 
one hand, voluntary disclosure makes it possible for financial analysts to create valuable new 
information, such as superior forecasts and investment recommendations, thereby increasing 
demand for their services. Voluntary disclosure should furthermore lower the cost of 
information acquisition for analysts and thus increase their supply (Bhushan, 1989). On the 
other hand, public voluntary disclosure prevents analysts from distributing managers’ private 
information to investors. This could lead to a decline in demand for analysts’ services. The 
effect of disclosure on information intermediation, especially analysts following, should be 
therefore answered empirically.  
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Healy et al. (1999) find empirically that increases in disclosure come with increases in 
institutional ownership and analyst following. Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1996) find that 
firms with more informative disclosures (higher AIMR rating) have larger analyst following 
and Francis et al. (1998) find an increase in analyst coverage for firms making conference 
calls. These studies show that expanded disclosure can improve intermediation for a firm’s 
stock in the capital market.  
There are also studies, which show not only that the quantity of information intermediation 
increases but also its quality. Lang and Lundholm (1996) provide empirical evidence that 
firms with more informative disclosure policies have more accurate analyst earnings 
forecasts, less dispersion among individual analyst forecasts and less volatility in forecast 
revisions. Additionally, Bowen, Davis, and Matsumoto (2002) find that analyst forecast 
accuracy is higher for firms that regularly hold earnings-related conference calls. Hope 
(2001) finds that analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy is positively related to annual report 
disclosure in the US what suggests that increased amount of information in annual reports 
helps analysts in forecasting earnings. Ashbaugh and Pincus (1999) investigate the accuracy 
of analysts’ forecast errors before and after the adoption of the higher IAS disclosure standard 
by non-US firms. They find that the change in forecast errors is weakly negative.  
 
(4) Voluntary disclosure, cost of capital and the value of the firm 
The above studies show that disclosure reduces information asymmetry what increases the 
liquidity of the stock and attracts increased demand from institutional investors that need 
liquidity and require or cause higher analyst coverage. This in turn should reduce the firm’s 
cost of equity financing and increase firm value.  
This theory has been confirmed by several studies showing that greater disclosure enhances 
stock market liquidity and thereby reduces cost of equity capital through reduced transaction 
costs or increased demand for a firms securities (e.g. Demsetz, 1968; Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986; Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996).  
More recently, several studies have examined the link between disclosure and the firm’s cost 
of capital more directly. The results are mixed and dependent on the disclosure metric and 
research design used. Most studies indicate that increased disclosure indeed reduces the cost 
of capital (Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998; Botosan and Plumlee 2000; Hail 2002; Kothari 
and Short, 2003).  
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Botosan (1997) finds a negative association between the cost of equity capital and the level of 
voluntary disclosures in the annual report for firms with low analyst following. She finds 
however no association between these variables for firms with a high analyst following. In a 
similar study, Hail finds (2002) a negative and highly significant association between 
disclosure and cost of equity capital for Swiss companies. Botosan and Plumlee (2000) and 
Kothari and Short (2003) examine the relationship between the cost of equity capital and 
different aspects of disclosure. They find mixed results depending on either the type of 
disclosure (annual report, quarterly and IR disclosure) or the implication of the disclosure 
(favorable, unfavorable information). These studies are reviewed in greater detail in     
chapter 4.  
While most studies examined the cost of equity capital, Sengupta (2000) examines whether 
voluntary disclosure reduces the interest rate a firm pays on its private debt contracts. He 
finds a negative relationship between the two variables. 
 
Evidence on the relationship between disclosure and cost of capital is an important research 
subject, but the real challenge is to estimate the effect of increased disclosure on firm value. 
Empirical testing of the relationship between disclosure and firm value is very difficult and 
would require long term testing periods. However, given the importance and sensitivity of the 
discount rate and the presumably low cost of additional disclosure for most firms, the net 
effect of increased disclosure could be expected to be positive. So find Healy, Hutton and 
Palepu (1999) that firms expanding disclosure experience a significant simultaneous increase 
in stock price that are unrelated to current earnings performance. They find a 7% 
improvement in the first year of the disclosure increase and 8% in the following year. 
Similarly, results in Froidevaux (2002) for Switzerland also indicate that an increase in 
disclosure is followed by higher subsequent stock returns.  
 
(5) Voluntary disclosure and manipulation of financial markets 
According to Bushee and Leuz (2003) disclosure reduces the firm’s cost of capital only if it is 
credible and not self-serving. Given a possible relationship between voluntary disclosure and 
firm value there is however a strong incentive for management to manipulate firm value 
trough self-serving disclosure. Security regulators and the financial press often claim that 
firms engage in voluntary disclosure to artificially increase a firm’s stock price. Indeed, a 
number of papers find that such disclosure appear to temporarily increase stock prices (e.g., 
 17 
Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998a,b; Lang and Lundholm, 2000). Lang and Lundholm (2000), 
for example, examine corporate disclosure activity around seasoned equity offerings. They 
find that six months before the offering, firms dramatically increase their disclosure and 
therefore experience price increases prior to the offering. After the announcement of their 
intent to issue equity, they however suffer much larger price declines. This suggests that they 
might have used the disclosure increase to ‘hype the stock’.  
Other research demonstrates a relationship between information asymmetry and earnings 
management (e.g., Imhoff and Thomas, 1994; Richardson, 1998; Lobo and Zhou, 2001). 
Managers who want to engage in earnings management have incentives to reduce disclosure 
because the effectiveness of their earnings management efforts depends on the level of 
information asymmetry between themselves and investors. Lobo and Zhou (2001) find, 
consistent with the theoretical prediction, a statistically significant negative relationship 
between corporate disclosure and earnings management. These results hold for all three 
components of corporate disclosure: annual disclosure, quarterly disclosure, and investor 
relation’s disclosure. Richardson (1998) finds that the level of information asymmetry, as 
measured by the bid-ask spread and the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, is positively related 
to the degree of earnings management. Imhoff and Thomas (1994) provide evidence that 
analysts’ disclosure quality ratings are positively related to the conservatism of accounting 
methods and to the amount of detail underlying reported numbers. 
These results suggest that firms engaging in less earnings management disclose more 
information and firms disclosing more information engage in less earnings management. It 
seems that managers of firms that disclose more information have less flexibility to manage 
earnings. An alternative way of stating this is that shareholders of firms that have more 
informative disclosure policies can more easily detect earnings management and management 
is therefore less likely to engage in such behavior. These results are consistent with one of the 
SEC’s objectives to encourage companies to disclose more information in order to reduce 
earnings management. 
 
Determinants of voluntary disclosure 
After examining the economic consequences of voluntary disclosure, it is important to 
examine its determinants. Studies indicate that the extent of corporate disclosure is a function 
of: 
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• firm size: Singhvi and Desai (1971), Buzby (1974), Firth (1979), Chow and Wong-
Boren (1987), Susanto (1992),  McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993), Hossain, Tan, and 
Adams (1994);  
• the need for capital: Malone, Fries and Jones (1993); Lang and Lundhom (2000), 
Schrand and Verrecchia (2002); 
• agency and proprietary costs: Verrecchia (1983), Gibbins, Richardson, and 
Waterhouse (1992);  
• listing status: Singhvi and Desai (1971), Meek and Gray (1989), and Hossain et al. 
(1994); Saudagaran and Biddle (1995); 
• profitability: Singhvi and Desai (1971); 
• ownership status: McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993); Hossain et al. (1994); 
• industry type: AIMR (1997).  
 
Some relationships are however weak and not verified by other research. The most important 
and consistent determinants of disclosure appear to be size, the need for capital, the level of 
agency and proprietary cost, and listing status. 
Size seems to be the most important determinant of the disclosure level. Large firms generally 
disclose more information than small firms. Firth (1979) and Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) 
hypothesize that larger companies have higher information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders. Such asymmetry therefore arises higher agency costs and to reduce these 
agency costs, larger firms disclose more information than smaller firms. Furthermore, larger 
companies have stronger incentives to improve their corporate reputation and public image 
by disclosing more information, as they are better known in the public. McKinnon and 
Dalimunthe (1993) state that nondisclosure of large firms may be interpreted as bad news that 
could have a negative effect on the companies stock price. Large firms also attract the 
attention of governmental institutions and increased disclosure may reduce government 
intervention (Firth, 1979; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987).  
Another determinant of disclosure in relation to size is pointed out by Hong and Huang 
(2001). In contrast to existing theories, they suggest that small companies’ management may 
decide on costly investment in investor relations such as voluntary disclosures not to improve 
the share price but to enhance the liquidity of their block of shares in case they have to sell 
large portion of their equity holdings. Mostly management and large shareholders benefit 
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from this disclosure investments while all shareholders carry its’ costs. The characteristics of 
insiders such as liquidity needs, size of equity stakes may therefore also be determinants of 
the extent of voluntary disclosure across firms.  
 
The need for capital is another important determinant of voluntary disclosure. Lang and 
Lundholm (2000) find that corporations increase their disclosure activity six months before 
an equity offering. However, they find no change in the frequency of forward-looking 
statements prior to the offering, what is discouraged by the securities law.  
Underpricing in IPO’s is a significant cost of raising capital that arises from information 
asymmetry at the IPO date. This cost can be potentially lowered by disclosure. Schrand and 
Verrecchia (2002) show that greater disclosure frequency in the pre-IPO period is associated 
with lower underpricing. The percentage of ownership retained by insiders and firm size 
positively affects a firm’s disclosure frequency.  
 
According to Verrecchia (1983) and Gibbins, Richardson, and Waterhouse (1992) the 
disclosure level can be explained by the interaction of agency and proprietary costs. 
Companies disclose information to reduce agency costs but by increasing the level of 
disclosure a firm may at the same time incur proprietary costs. Analytical research by 
Verrecchia (1983) and Feltham and Xie (1992) indicate that firms for which the benefit from 
the reduction of agency costs is less than the proprietary cost will withhold private 
information. Also Low (1996) provides evidence that disclosure is increasing with agency 
costs and decreasing with proprietary costs of disclosure.  
 
Listing status is another major determinant of disclosure. Ball (1995) and Nobes (1998) 
demonstrate that the disclosure level is generally higher in ‘equity’ financed countries than in 
‘debt’ financed countries. A listing, for example, by foreign companies on a US stock 
exchange leads to lower cost of capital for such companies (Saudagaran and Biddle, 1995). 
Ball et al. (2000) argue that firms in common law countries tend to use more equity financing 
and have therefore usually more extensive accounting standards and better financial 
disclosure than firms in code law countries.  
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Disclosure methods 
After examining the need for disclosure, the market consequences of disclosure and the 
determinants of disclosure, we now examine the methods used to disclose information from 
the company to the investors.  
Traditionally, firms disclose information on the general assembly and through the printed 
annual or quarterly reports.  With the development of IT in recent years, companies started to 
report via the Internet. Managers are now faced with decisions about the costs and benefits of 
the different disclosure methods. Traditional paper-based disclosure has its limitations; due to 
the increase in global investments and investors, the paper form has become more expensive 
and limited in capacity to reach in a timely manner investors (Portes and Rey, 2000). Internet 
reporting can increase the usefulness of information in terms of comprehensiveness, 
accuracy, timeliness, frequency and relevance. It is more cost effective, fast, flexible in 
format, and accessible to all types of users worldwide (Debreceny et al., 2002). The increased 
use of IT can thus reduce information asymmetry by its immediate dissemination and global 
reach of users.  
On the other hand, Xiao (1996) points out that the increased use of IT could create a 
disclosure problem. He states that the increased amount of information provided for internal 
users due to greater use of IT is not likely to be incorporated on the same scale for 
communication with external users. This could result in increased and not reduced 
information asymmetry by the greater use of IT in corporations. To prevent further increase 
in the information asymmetry between internal and external users, companies should make 
greater use of IT for communication with external users. The SEC already stated that it would 
encourage the use of the Internet as a prime dissemination tool (SEC, 2001).  
 
The optimal disclosure level 
Concluding the above review, it seems that a generally applicable optimal level of disclosure 
does not exist. The optimal disclosure level depends on the costs and benefits for a specific 
company.  
The benefits of increased disclosure include increased liquidity that leads to higher 
institutional ownership and higher analyst following, all contributing to lower cost of capital. 
Weighting against these benefits are three primary costs of increased disclosure, namely the 
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cost of preparing and disseminating the information, the cost of competitive disadvantage 
attributable to disclosure, and the potential cost of litigation caused by disclosure. 
The cost of preparation and dissemination are generally not very high, especially for large 
companies. These costs are furthermore paid by the company, but a great number of users 
benefit from it. It thus makes sense economically that the company prepares the information 
users need to avoid multiple private collection of the same information. More important for 
most companies is the cost of competitive disadvantage from their disclosure. One must 
however consider that every company that suffers competitive disadvantage from disclosure 
could gain competitive advantage from comparable disclosure by competitors. This creates 
the concept of net competitive disadvantage from disclosure. According to FASB (2001) 
three factors appear to determine whether information creates competitive advantage or 
disadvantage: the type of information, the level of detail, and the timing of disclosure. 
Finally, litigation costs include the cost of meritless suits attributable to disclosure. The effect 
of disclosure on litigation costs is however not obvious. Theoretically, more disclosure 
should lead to smaller claims because the stock market could form more realistic expectations 
of the company's future cash flows. The smaller the difference between the market price and 
the intrinsic value, the smaller will the share price decline from disappointed expectations. 
This smaller decline reduces the motivation for suits in court. Defending companies would 
also have better defenses because they provide adequate information of the firm’s situation. 
For these reasons, we believe that litigation costs caused by meritless suits might actually 
decrease, rather than increase with increasing disclosure. Field et al. (2003) shows 
empirically that disclosure reduces litigation risk. 
 
In determining the optimal level of disclosure, management must weight the specific cost 
components against the potential benefits of more disclosure for their company. An optimal 
disclosure level is not observed in practice because of differences in costs and benefits of 
disclosure for each individual company. Costs as well as benefits appear to be different 
depending on the method of disclosure and on the company characteristics identified earlier 
(size, need for capital, level of agency and proprietary cost, listing status, etc). 
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3. Investor Relation Web site Content Analysis of US firms 
“If I can’t find what I’m looking for on an IR Web site, 
 I’m on to the next company.” 
 Buy-side investor 
 
Investor relation is a traditional discipline of corporate communication and is defined as “the 
management of the relationship between a company with publicly traded securities and the 
holders or potential holders of such securities” (Investor Relations Society, 1997). Investor 
relation via Internet results in an investor relation Web site. On the corporate investor 
relations Web sites, all information assumed to be relevant to investors such as financial 
information, press releases or share price information can be pooled and hyperlinked.  
Furthermore, direct communication between investors and the investor relations department 
via e-mail, mailing lists or Web casts can be provided. The company’s Web site is also often 
referred to for further information in traditional press releases and company reports (Ettredge, 
Richardson and Scholz, 2000). The Internet has thus become increasingly integrated into the 
investor relation activities of a firm. Internet reporting also gained on importance for analysts, 
who after the introduction of Reg. FD lost their advantage towards other investors in gaining 
information from companies’ management.  A study conducted by Kraker & Company in 
2001 finds that 44% of the analysts surveyed said they use corporate Web sites daily and 81% 
said they use them at least weekly. Increasingly also individual investors trading online rely 
on information presented on corporate Web sites (IASC, 1999). According to an IR Magazine 
report, 59% of individual investors use the Internet as their primary source for company 
news.  
 
In this study, we extend the prior research on Internet disclosure by providing insights into 
the current dissemination of information in the investor relation section on corporate Web 
sites. Based on the content analysis, we establish a measure of Internet investor relation 
disclosure level, which will be further used in the fourth chapter to examine the relationship 
between investor relation Internet disclosure and the cost of equity capital. The relationship 
between the two variables will ultimately prove whether Internet disclosure is useful to 
investors.  
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This chapter consists of a short review of related research, the research design with sample 
selection and sample description, our methodology in analyzing the content of the investor 
relation Web sites, and finally the results of the content analysis. 
 
3.1 Review of Related Research 
The most common form of corporate disclosure examined in empirical accounting research is 
the annual report (e.g. Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Botosan, 
1997; Hail, 2002). Even though the annual report is the main method of corporate 
communication, other types of disclosure, such as quarterly reports, press releases, 
conference calls, investor relation disclosure and increasingly Internet reporting, exist. In this 
study, we examine the most modern way of disclosure to investors: Internet reporting. We 
therefore review the literature of empirical studies concerning the practice of Internet-based 
corporate reporting.  
 
Internet reporting is a recent phenomenon tied to the development of this medium in the mid 
1990’s. The early studies on Internet reporting from 1996 until 1998 mostly focus on the 
existence or non-existence of Web sites and also on financial information presented on the 
Web sites. Among these studies are e.g. Petravick and Gillett (1996), Louwers, Pasewark and 
Typpo (1996), Lymer (1997), Gray and Debreceny (1997), and Deller, Stubenrath and Weber 
(1998). These researches are of limited use for the current state of Internet reporting due to 
the rapid development of the Internet in recent years. As a representative example, we shortly 
present the results of the study of Deller et al. (1998). They analyze the Web sites of 100 US, 
100 UK and 100 German firms representing each country's relevant stock market 100 index 
(S&P, FTSE and DAX). The study shows that 95% of the US, 85% of the UK and 76% of the 
German companies had Web sites. From that 91% of US companies, 72% of UK and 71% of 
German companies use the Web site for the investor relation section. Balance sheet data was 
supplied by 86% of the US, by 53% of the UK and by 46% of the German corporations. 
Other annual report items such as ‘profit and loss account data’ similarly varied across these 
three countries. 
In a more recent study Ettredge, Richardson and Scholz (2002) examine the dissemination of 
information for investors on corporate Web sites based on a list of 4 required items and 12 
voluntary information items. The most common item on a company’s Web site is the 
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financial news releases found on 81% of the sites. Other voluntary items are transfer agent 
information4 (56%) and stock price links to other Web sites (50%). Required items include 
quarterly reports (57%), annual reports (53%) and links to SEC-EDGAR5 (51%). The authors 
find that three out of four required items are found on more than half of the sites, compared to 
only three out of 12 voluntary items. Therefore, there is greater uniformity in the presentation 
of required information relative to voluntary disclosures and, on average, more required items 
were found on each Web site than voluntary items.  
There are also studies conducted by professional bodies such as the Association for 
Investment Management and Research (AIMR, 1998), the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (CICA, 1999), the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC, 1999) 
or the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, 2000). 
The IASC (1999) report, for example, examines 660 corporations in 22 countries around the 
world. The results show that 86% of the corporations were presented on the Internet and 62% 
of companies publish some form of financial reporting on their Web sites.  
The FASB study (2000) surveys the Fortune 100 companies. They find that 99 companies 
have Web sites of which 93 have some form of investor relation section. Within this section 
more than 80% of the companies provide general corporate information and 73% provide 
financial summaries, fewer provide detailed financial reports such as an income statement 
(65%), MD&A (57%) or segmental reporting (28%). They find that 34 of the 292 possible 
items appear on more than 50 percent of the Web sites. The most popular financial and 
business reporting attribute is the chairman’s message, which appears on 74% of the 99 Web 
sites.  
 
There is also a number of studies focusing on firm characteristics rather than the content of 
disclosure on the Internet. Marston and Leow (1998) as well as Ashbaugh, Johnstone, and 
Warfield (1999) find that large and profitable firms are more likely to disclose their financial 
information on the Internet than other firms. Ashbaugh et al. further find that firm size is the 
only significant variable explaining the dissemination of either a comprehensive set of 
financial statements, a link to the annual report elsewhere on the Internet, or a link to the 
                                                 
4
 The transfer agent is usually a commercial bank, appointed by a corporation, to maintain records of stock and 
bond owners (Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms, 1998) 
5
 A link to the US Security and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and 
Retrieval (EDGAR) system  
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SEC’s EDGAR site.  Ettredge, Richardson, and Scholz (1999) find that the amount of 
financial disclosure on corporate Web sites is positively related to firm size, to the need for 
new external equity capital and the quality of the firm’s traditional corporate reporting 
practices. They also find that higher level of analyst following is associated with objective, 
extensive financial information, while a higher level of retail ownership is associated with 
more subjective, abbreviated financial data.  
In a later study Ettredge, Richardson, and Scholz (2002) distinguish between voluntary and 
required information items and find that the presence of required items is significantly 
associated only with size and a proxy for information asymmetry, while voluntary 
information item disclosure is associated with size, information asymmetry, demand for 
external capital, and firms’ traditional disclosures. They also find that Web site disclosure is 
not associated with firm performance, measured as returns for the preceding year, and that 
Web site disclosure is negatively associated with the correlation of earnings and returns, 
consistent with the traditional disclosure study from Lang and Lundholm (1993).  
Debreceny, Gray and Rahman (2002) examine financial reporting on the Internet in 22 
countries and find that firm size, a listing of non-US companies on US securities markets and 
the level of technology are positively related to Internet financial disclosure. Growth 
prospects, intangibles and listing on foreign securities markets are negatively associated with 
Internet financial reporting.  
 
In conclusion, even though there are many studies that examine Internet disclosure in one 
way or another, we have not found a study that provides a recent detailed comprehensive 
Internet disclosure content analysis. In the following study, we try to close this gap in the 
literature by examining the investor relation disclosure practices on corporate Web sites of 
160 US companies in four different industries in 2003.  
 
3.2 Research Design  
The review of previous research showed that there is still a need for studies that examine the 
modern ways of disclosure such as Internet reporting. The purpose of our study is to examine 
in detail, which information US companies provide to investors on their Web sites. For that 
reason, we make a detailed content analysis of the information disclosed in the investor 
relation section of corporate Web sites. 
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Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics for the Sample 
Sample Selection 
The sample chosen for the study covers 160 non-financial US companies in the year 2003. 
We had to limit our sample to this one year horizon because historical Web sites are generally 
unavailable.  
Our sampling procedure takes into consideration that the researched companies would be in a 
country with relatively high use of Internet and well-established, developed, active, and well-
regulated stock markets. For that reason, we chose the US market. We also consider that 
disclosure is size specific (e.g. Ashbaugh et al., 1999) and industry specific (AIMR, 1997) 
and distinguish explicitly between size and industry membership in our sample selection 
process. In this process, companies have been first selected based on their industry 
membership and second, within each industry, furthermore based on size. This sample 
selection procedure allows us not only to separate the effect of disclosure better from firm 
size but also to examine Internet disclosure differences across industries. 
 
Companies in our sample are taken from the four main industries in the US; namely the 
healthcare, industrial goods and services, consumer discretionary, and the information 
technology industry.  We limit our sample to these four industries because they seem to 
provide a representative sample of general Internet disclosure practices in the US including 
dynamic companies, stable companies, cyclical companies and non-cyclical companies.  
Within each industry, we separate the sample into large and small companies based on 
market capitalization and sales. Market capitalization is an objective and commonly accepted 
criterion for size as it is based on the market value of the company. Sales corrects size as 
measured by market capitalization for highly priced growth companies that are fundamentally 
still rather small companies. For the exact size criteria for each industry see table 2 in the 
appendix.  
Furthermore, all companies chosen for the sample are classified by Research Insight as non-
bankrupt and non-ADR with their fiscal year ending in December. Each company must also 
be followed by a minimum of two analysts.  
 
It proved however difficult to find an adequate number of companies comparable in both of 
these size measures in each industry. To conserve comparability, we therefore limited our 
sample in each of the four industries to 20 large and 20 small companies. The total number of 
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160 companies is conventional and adequate for this kind of research and represents a 
representative picture of the current state of investor relation Internet disclosure among large 
and small companies in the US market.6 As shown in table 1 in the appendix, six from these 
160 companies had to be later excluded due to technological problems in the process of 
saving their Web sites.7 This reduces the sample to 154 US companies. 
 
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample 
Descriptive statistics for the sample firms is provided in table 3 in the appendix. To ensure 
consistency with our goal of isolating firm size from disclosure level, we present descriptive 
statistics for the full sample consisting of large and small companies together as well as for 
the two sub-samples of small and large companies. We also provide descriptive statistics for 
each of the four industries (table 3 in the appendix).  
Consistent with our sample selection procedure the descriptive statistics shows that the two 
size measures, market value and sales, exhibit substantial cross-sectional variation in firm 
size between the large and small companies. Market capitalization (MVAL) for the full 
sample ranges from $517 million at the first percentile to $208 billion at the 99th percentile of 
the distribution. Mean market capitalization for the full sample is $18.9 billion. Sales 
(SALES) for the full sample range from $459 million at the first percentile to $74 billion at 
the 99th percentile. Mean sales are about $9.5 billion. 
Within the sample of small and large companies the two size measures are comparable. Large 
companies have a market capitalization that ranges from slightly more than $5 billion at the 
first percentile up to $273 billion at the 99th percentile with a mean of $36 billion (table 3 in 
the appendix). For sales the differences are smaller. These figures show that in the large sub-
sample we are indeed examining large companies. Furthermore, we do believe that whether a 
large company has a market value of $5 billion or $200 billion makes little difference in 
relation to their level of Internet disclosure. Although it would be preferable to examine more 
narrow ranges of the size measures, this is not possible because not enough comparable large 
companies exist in the examined industries.  
                                                 
6
 The IASC (1999) covered 30 companies in each of the 22 countries of their study. The FASB (2000) study 
examined only 100 US companies.   
7
 The companies excluded were one small company in the healthcare and the industrial goods and services 
industry, two large and two small companies in the consumer discretionary industry. No company had to be 
excluded in the IT industry. 
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The companies in the small companies sub-sample are more comparable in terms of both 
market value and sales as more comparable companies in each industry could be found. 
Market values (sales) range from $503 ($451) million at the first percentile to $1733 ($1675) 
million at the 99th percentile. We thus avoid micro caps with market capitalizations below 
$500 million.  
 
Methodology 
In our study, first the Web sites have been located and saved for each company in the sample, 
then the information from the investor relation section was collected and finally the content 
of the investor relation section was analyzed. 
 
Finding Web Sites 
In order to find the Web sites of the companies in our sample, the search engine at 
‘www.google.com’ was used. Only when a company could not be found in this way, we used 
the search engine at the respective stock exchange (www.NYSE.com or 
www.NASDAQ.com). As these exchanges provide hyperlinks to the companies’ Web sites, 
all Web sites could be located in one way or the other. 
 
Collection of Information  
Over a period of three days, from the 9th to 11th August 2003, the investor relation Web sites 
of each company in the sample have been saved using the ‘Web Archive, single file (*mht)’ 
featured in the Web browser. This procedure takes the risk that companies could have 
changed their Web sites over the data collection period and the collected data would not be 
perfectly comparable across companies. To mitigate this potential problem, the data was 
collected over a weekend, starting on Friday after the close of the New York stock exchange 
and ending on Sunday evening. Furthermore, the collection window was chosen not to 
interfere with the earnings season on Wall Street.  
 
Before collecting information from the investor relation section of corporate Web sites, we 
established a list with different criteria based on findings of AICPA (1994), Botosan (1997), 
OECD (1999), Global Reporting Initiative (2002), FASB (2000), Ernst &Young (2000), Hail 
(2002) and Ettredge et al. (2002). We complemented the criteria from their research with 
items identified on several corporate Web sites in a first review, so that in fact we collected 
 29 
all major information items available on a company’s investor relation Web site. This 
procedure extents previous research and provides a comprehensive measure for the actual 
information content of the investor relation section. Our collection of items does not however 
include information in the annual report, quarterly report, the SEC statements, or the 
sustainability report because the purpose of the study is the content analysis of the investor 
Web site and not the content analysis of the above reports.  
 
The item collection was based on visible information as presented on the Web sites in the 
investor relation section using a basic Web browser (Microsoft Internet Explorer Version 
6.0).  
 
Content Analysis 
After we collected all major items from the investor relation section of each company’s Web 
site, we categorized them into general items and information items. In the general items 
category we collected service or help items for investors such as whether the Web site has a 
visible link to the investor relation Web site, a site map, a search box, or contact information 
etc.  
Information items refer to corporate information for investors. They are further divided into 
three information categories: the corporate information category, the financial and stock 
information category, and the management and board of directors’ information category. This 
division not only simplifies the process of collecting information but also facilitates the 
analysis of the different information provided in the investor relation section.  
The corporate information category contains information about the company such as 
company overview, products and services, operation’s information, news etc. The financial 
and stock information category summarizes stock information, main financial information 
such as the annual or quarterly report, other financial information like financial ratios or 
dividend information, and also information in relation to analysts. The management and 
board of directors’ information category contains besides the management and board of 
directors’ biographies also corporate governance information and management discussion 
and outlook information.  
In the content analysis, we collected information on a total of 94 information items and 8 
general items. A detailed list of all 102 items is provided in table 4 in the appendix.  
 
 30 
In the process of the content analysis, we checked whether or not each item from the list 
exists in the investor relation section of a company’s Web site. For each item that could be 
found a one (‘1’) was assigned and if the information could not be found a zero (‘0’) was 
assigned. Similar approaches have been used in previous studies of Internet disclosure (e.g. 
FASB, 2000).  
The general item ‘IR Link’ had to be investigated on a different basis. For this item a (‘1’) is 
assigned if the link to the investor relation section is visible on the first or second Web site 
without additionally opening other sections, a (‘0’) otherwise. We also include a link to the 
Web site of the SEC as a separate characteristic, because it includes many required filings, 
such as proxy information or insider transactions, which are not captured in the annual or 
quarterly SEC reports and are not always posted at the investor relation section. The direct 
link to the SEC web site also increases the reliability of the information. Here again the 
points are assigned based on existence or non-existence of the link to the SEC in the investor 
relation section.  
 
Using the above rules, a company can score a maximum of 94 points if it provides all items 
in the three information items categories and a maximum of 8 points in the general item 
category and a minimum of zero if no items are provided. The score for each company in 
each of the four item categories is created by adding the scores of the individual items within 
that category. The final disclosure score, which captures the corporate Internet disclosure 
level, is the sum of the score in the three information item categories. The general item 
category is analyzed separately because it includes items such as help for investors and 
service items not directly related to the information itself.   
This methodology allows and facilitates the comparison between companies within different 
information categories or even information items as well as the examination of the Internet 
disclosure level of a particular company or industry.  
 
3.3 Empirical Results of the Content Analysis 
In the following, we present the results of the categories of items we collected on the investor 
relation Web site distinguishing between size and industry. For a detailed list of collected 
items within each category see table 4 in appendix. We also present the twenty-five most and 
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least provided information items by large and small companies on their investor relation Web 
sites.   
 
Internet disclosure in relation to size: Large versus small companies 
Table 3.1 presents how many percent of the total items collected in each of the four 
categories, large and small firms provide on average on their Web sites.  
The results of the General Items category show that large (small) firms provide on average 
75.2% (61.3%) of all collected general items in the investor relation section. These high 
scores show that there should be enough ‘service’ or ‘help’ items for investors on the 
companies’ Web sites. So provide e.g. 86% of the large and small firms a separate link to the 
investor relation section (see table 4 in the appendix). The remaining 14% of all companies 
provide this link in other Web site sections such as ‘Company information’ or ‘About us’. 
The information for investors can therefore be rather easily found. This fact also shows that 
every company in our sample provides a link to the investor relation section on its Web site 
implying that every company has an investor relation section under the title ‘Investor 
Relations’ or under another equivalent name such as ‘Financials’, ‘Financial Information’, 
‘Shareholder Information’ or ‘Investor Resources’. This clearly indicates the importance 
perceived by companies for the need to make investor relations information available on the 
Internet. One company in the consumer industry even designed the entire home page 
exclusively for investors.  
 
Table 3.1: Results for the General and Information Items categories for large and small firms and the 
full sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             For the detailed list of items in each category, see table 4 in the appendix. 
 
Category Large 
Firms 
Small 
Firms  
Full 
Sample 
General Items Category 75.2% 61.3% 68.3% 
I. Corporate Information Category  
II. Financial and Stock Category  
III. Management and Board of Directors Category 
19.7% 
42.2% 
26.8% 
13.3% 
38.9% 
15.8% 
16.6% 
40.6% 
21.3% 
Total Average of I, II and III Categories  31.7% 25.6% 28.7% 
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Another interesting fact is that the correlation coefficient between the scores of the general 
items and the information items is positive and above 50% (table 4 in the appendix) 
indicating that companies providing more information also better facilitate the finding of the 
information and provide more service for the investors such as e-mail alert, information 
request, contact information etc.  
 
In respect to the information items, table 3.1. shows that large firms provide on average more 
information than small firms in each category. This confirms previous findings that 
disclosure in general as well as Internet disclosure is size specific. From 94 possible 
information items examined on a company’s Web site, large companies provide on average 
31.7% of these items compared to small companies that provide only 25.6% of all the 
information items examined.  
In general, most information is provided in the financial and stock category, where from the 
43 information items examined, large (small) companies provide on average 42.2% (38.9%) 
of these items on their Web sites. However, large companies provide only 19.7% of the 
information items in the Corporate Information category and only 26.8% in the Management 
and Board of Directors category. Small companies do even worse in that respect. This is 
rather a poor result and indicates that investors might sometimes have problems with finding 
information within the latter two categories.  
In the following, we present the results within each of the three information items categories.  
 
Table 3.2: Corporate Information category results for large and small firms and the full sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the detailed list of items in each category, see table 4 in the appendix. 
I. Corporate Information Category Large 
Firms  
Small 
Firms  
Full 
Sample 
1. Company Overview 20% 14.5% 17.3% 
2. Products and Services   8.6% 3.9% 6.3% 
3. Operations 3.8% 1.6% 2.7% 
4. News 58.7% 45.8% 52.3% 
5. Sustainability Information 9.9% 1.6% 5.8% 
Average 19.7% 13.3% 16.6% 
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Table 3.2 shows that ‘News’ is the most provided information item (large firms 58.7%; small 
firms 45.8%) within the Corporate Information category followed by the ‘Company 
Overview’ (large firms 20%; small firms 14.5%).  Sustainability, products and services 
information or information about operations is difficult to find on companies Web sites. 
Thus, companies make the impression to provide few company specific information that is 
usually difficult to obtain from other sources. This is a major obstacle for investors who base 
their investment decisions on fundamental analysis. It seems that companies orient their 
investor Web sites more towards institutional investors than individual investors. Institutional 
investors generally already own and know the stock and simply want to update their view 
about the company. This would explain why ‘News’ is besides the required SEC fillings one 
of the most provided information item on the Web sites.  
 
The information in the Financial and Stock Information category is better provided by 
companies as visible from table 3.3. Besides the SEC filings with 81%, companies in this 
category provide a large amount of financial information (large firms 41.2%; small firms 
37.2%) such as the balance sheet, income statements, cash flow statements or the annual 
report. Companies, which do not provide their annual report in the investor relation section 
usually provide it in another section such as ‘Corporate Information’ or in ‘About Us’. 
 
Table 3.3: Financial and Stock Information category results for large and small firms and the full 
sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            For the detailed list of items in each category, see table 4 in the appendix. 
 
II. Financial and Stock Information Category Large 
Firms 
Small 
Firms 
Full 
Sample 
1. Main Financial Information 41.2% 37.2% 39.2% 
2. SEC Fillings 81% 81.1% 81% 
3. Other Financial Information 25.1% 16.1% 20.6% 
4. Analysts Information 37.9% 38% 38% 
5. Stock Information 42.8% 40.2% 41.6% 
Average 42.2% 38.9% 40.6% 
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Table 3.3 shows that analysts’ information such as conference calls, presentations or event 
calendar and stock information such as stock quotes or charts, ticker symbol, stock exchanges 
on which company is quoted and historical price look up are widely available on the 
companies’ Web sites (large firms 37.9%; small firms 38%). Most of this information can 
however also be found in other places on the Internet such as www.Yahoo.com or 
www.moneycentral.com. Again it seems that companies do best in providing information that 
is available elsewhere and do much worse in providing company specific information such as 
e.g. the management discussion of past data and outlook (see table 3.4).  
In the Management and Board of Directors category, only 21.3% of the examined 
information is on average provided by the companies in our sample. Especially the small 
companies provide very little information in this category. 
 
Table 3.4: Management and Board of Directors Information category results for large and small 
firms and the full sample 
          For the detailed list of items in each category, see table 4 in the appendix. 
 
Problematic for both institutional and individual investors is the fact that almost no forward 
looking information (see ‘Management Forecast or Outlook’ table 4, panel C in the appendix) 
is provided. This might be explained by a company’s fear to voluntary disclose such 
information to a wide range of users.8 Another reason could be that forward looking 
information is already discussed in the MD&A section of the annual report or the SEC filings 
and companies do not see the need to provide it separately on the Web sites. 
                                                 
8
 Some companies show legal disclaimers for the person entering the Web site others even require prior 
registration or allow only registered analysts to retrieve certain information such as forward looking 
information. 
III. Management and Board of Directors Category Large 
Firms 
Small 
Firms 
Full 
Sample 
1. Management Discussion of Past Data and Outlook  5.8% 1.3% 3.6% 
2. Executives and Management Information 27.7% 26.8% 27.3% 
3. Board of Directors Information 26.9% 21.9% 24.5% 
4. Corporate Governance 30.4% 9.5% 20.1% 
Average 26.8% 15.8% 21.3% 
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Table 3.4 shows that the differences between large and small companies in the Management 
and Board of Directors category are on average not large except for ‘Corporate Governance’ 
information. Large companies provide 30.4% of the examined corporate governance items 
such as committee and charter information, governance guidelines, code of conduct and 
ethics, while small companies provide on average only a meager 9.5% of these information 
items. Large companies might have more quickly adapted their disclosure practices in 
relation to corporate governance after the recent accounting scandals. 
Even though large (small) companies provide 26.8% (15.8%) of all examined items in the 
Management and Board of Directors category, information about ‘Management Discussion of 
Past Financial Data and Outlook’ are only rarely provided by both large (5.8%) and small 
companies (1.3%). This is very poor result indicating that investors might have problems 
finding this important information on corporate Web sites while analyzing the future 
prospects of a company.  
 
In the tables 3.5 and 3.6, we present the results of the 25 most and least provided information 
items on a corporate Web site by large and small companies. The complete list of collected 
items from the investor relation Web site ordered based on its popularity on the corporate 
Web sites is provided in table 6, 7 and 8 in the appendix. 
The tables show that SEC fillings such as form 10K, 10Q or Section 16 and also archived 
SEC fillings are among the most provided information items by large as well as by small 
companies. The same applies to the annual report, news or archived news. Historical annual 
reports are more often provided by large companies (82%) than by small companies (68%). 
Financial information such as stock quote, stock exchange on which the company is traded, 
the ticker symbol, and charts are often provided on the Web sites of both large and small 
companies.  
Interesting is that in the 25 most provided items only large companies provide such items as 
corporate governance guidelines and earnings releases. On the other hand, small companies 
provide more financial items like financial ratios and the market capitalization. These 
information items are furthermore mostly presented by third party investor relation providers.  
The least provided information items by both large and small companies are transactions and 
relations among related parties, compensation of executives and management and director’s 
compensation. Management forecasts and management discussion of past financial data, 
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Form 10K 97%
Form 10Q 96%
Archived SEC fillings 95%
Annual report 91%
 Section 16 or link to it 91%
News 84%
Stock exchanges on which company is registered 84%
Ticker symbol 82%
 Stock quotes 79%
Archived news 75%
General description of the companys' business 68%
Historical annual report 68%
Charts 67%
List of analysts 63%
Conference calls 61%
List of executives and management 55%
Calender of events 53%
List of Board of Directors members 50%
Historical price lookup or link to it 49%
Experience of executives and management 42%
Important financial ratios 41%
Market capitalization 41%
Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) 39%
Analysts' presentations 39%
Contact to analysts 38%
historical segment data, stock repurchase information or debt information can also rarely be 
found on a company’s Web site.  
 
Table 3.5: Twenty-five most and least provided information items (large firm sub-sample) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6: Twenty-five most and least provided information items (small firm sub-sample) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Management forecast or outlook 9%
Historical segment data 8%
Company investments (e.g. acquisitions) 8%
Directors independence standards 8%
Commitment to stakeholders, mission 6%
Debt information 6%
Age of executives and management 6%
Company broad goal or objectives 5%
Industry specific information 5%
Historical financial statements 5%
 Discription of the users of the products 4%
List of principle brands, registered trademarks 4%
New products 4%
Partners 4%
Stock repurchase information 4%
List of major shareholders 4%
Description of property, plants and equipment 3%
Number of shares held by management 3%
Management discussion of past financial data 3%
Compensation of executives and management 3%
List of suppliers 1%
Distribution channels 1%
Manufacturing or service production 1%
 Directors compensation 1%
Transactions or/and relations among related parties 1%
Partners 3%
Historical segment data 3%
Stock repurchase information 3%
Management forecast or outlook 3%
Compensation of executives and management 3%
Age of Board of Directors members 3%
By-law 3%
Description of property, plants and equipment 1%
Age of executives and management 1%
Certification of incorporation 1%
Industry specific information 0%
 Discription of the users of the products 0%
List of principle brands, registered trademarks 0%
New products 0%
List of suppliers 0%
Distribution channels 0%
Manufacturing or service production 0%
Economic sustainability information (wages, job creation,etc) 0%
Environmental information 0%
Social information (health and safety, contributions) 0%
Historical financial statements 0%
Debt information 0%
Management discussion of past financial data 0%
 Directors compensation 0%
Transactions or/and relations among related parties 0%
*
Form 10K 97%
Form 10Q 96%
Annual report 94%
Archived SEC fillings 92%
 Section 16 or link to it 91%
News 90%
 Stock quotes 87%
Ticker symbol 86%
Historical annual report 82%
Stock exchanges on which company is registered 82%
Charts 79%
Archived news 74%
Calender of events 74%
Proxy statement 74%
Historical price lookup or link to it 67%
List of executives and management 60%
Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) 59%
List of Board of Directors members 59%
General description of the companys' business 56%
Analysts' presentations 56%
Dividend information 53%
Corporate governance guidelines 51%
Dividend history 47%
List of analysts 47%
Earnings releases 46%
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Disclosure in relation to industries 
The results within each of the four examined industries presented in table 3.7 show that IT 
companies provide on average the most information on their Web sites. This is not surprising 
given the fact that we are examining Internet disclosure; previous research showed that 
Internet disclosure is positively related to the level of a company’s technology (Debreceny et 
al., 2002). IT companies also operate in a more difficult to understand and more dynamic 
environment and thus should benefit the most by disclosing information to reduce 
information asymmetry. Out of the 94 maximum points a company can score in all 
information items categories IT companies provide 31.1%, healthcare 30.9%, consumer 
companies 26.8% and industrial companies 26% of the total information items examined. 
This industry ranking holds also almost true, with one exception, in the different size sub-
samples: large IT companies provide as much information as large healthcare companies, 
followed by industrial and consumer companies; small IT firms provide more information 
than small healthcare, consumer and industrial companies (table 3.8).   
 
Table 3.7: Results of all item categories in relation to industries 
 
For the detailed list of items in each category, see table 5 in the appendix. 
 
Comparing the results in each category in table 3.7, we find that also in the General Items 
category the IT companies score the highest. By looking at the information items categories 
in greater detail, it can be seen that the companies in the IT industry provide more corporate 
information than the companies in the other three industries. The reason for this might be that 
the more specialized and complicated a company’s business, the more explanations for 
investors’ are needed. Also in the management and board of directors’ category the IT 
companies score the highest mainly because they provide more information in relation to 
Categories                     Healthcare  Industrial  Consumer  IT Average 
General Items  71.2%  67.3% 60.8% 73.4% 68.3% 
I. Corporate Information Category  
II. Financial and Stock Category  
III. Management and Board of Directors 
Category 
17.4% 
45% 
20.7% 
16% 
35.3% 
20.8% 
14.2% 
39% 
19.4% 
18.4% 
43% 
24.1% 
16.6% 
40.6% 
21.3% 
Total Average of Category I, II and III 30.9% 26% 26.8% 31.1% 28.7% 
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executives and management but also more management discussion of past data and outlook 
(see table 5 in the appendix). This could be explained by a more uncertain future of IT 
companies compared to other, more stable companies in the sample. In such an environment, 
the management and board of directors are relatively more important. IT companies are 
furthermore valued not based on their current financial performance but rather based on the 
future growth of the business and consequently more information about the future should be 
provided. This explains the high scores in the outlook category and the rather average 
disclosure score in the financial and stock category. IT companies do not need to highlight 
their current financial performance but more their future outlook. Furthermore, for most IT 
companies the financial situation in 2003 was not something that companies were proud to 
present to investors on their Web sites. 
 
Healthcare companies are on average not far behind the IT companies in terms of Internet 
disclosure to investors. They perform even better than IT companies in the financial and 
stock information category. This might be explained by the fact that healthcare companies are 
on average more profitable and therefore pleased to present their financial information to 
investors.  
After the healthcare industry, there is already a rather large disclosure gap to the next 
industries, the consumer discretionary and the industrial goods and services industry. The 
consumer discretionary companies provide in all categories more information than industrial 
companies except for the corporate information category. This could be because the Web 
sites of the companies in the consumer discretionary industry are more oriented towards 
customers than investors. There is a lot of information about products on the Web site but not 
especially prepared for investors and therefore usually not presented in the investor relation 
section. This indicates that the main goal of such a Web site is to inform customers and to sell 
products.  
Table 3.8 confirms the previous findings that large companies disclose more information than 
small companies (with the exception of the financial and stock information category in the 
consumer discretionary industry). It is much easier for small companies to provide a lot of 
information in this category than in other categories, because small companies outsource 
almost all information in the financial and stock category to third party investor relation 
providers such as e.g. Thomson Financial.  
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Table 3.8: Results of all items categories in relation to industry and size 
 
For the detailed list of items in each category, see table 5 in the appendix. 
 
Table 3.8. also shows that small companies generally provide less General Items such as a 
site map or a search box than large companies. This however can be partly explained by the 
fact that they also have smaller Web sites and thus less information to navigate trough. They 
however also provide less e-mail alert service, information request or other shareholders 
service such as investment calculator or glossary than large companies.  
 
Disclosure Scores 
In the following table, we present the disclosure score that captures the corporate Internet 
disclosure level to investors. It is the sum of the scores in the three information item 
categories. This score does not include the general items but only the information items as the 
former only facilitate navigation, service or help investors whereas the latter contains true 
information. 
In general, we find that there are large differences in the level of Internet disclosure across 
companies in the full sample and in both size sub-samples of large and small companies. The 
Internet disclosure score ranges in the full sample from a minimum of 6 points to a maximum 
of 56 points, in the sub-sample of large companies from 10 points to 56 points and in the sub-
sample of small companies from 6 points to 45 points (table 3.9).  The mean score for the full 
sample is 27 points showing that an average company scores about half the points of the best 
company. This again is also true for both size sub-samples. The mean scores for the small 
companies are lower than for the large companies in all three disclosure categories showing 
Categories                    Healthcare 
Large      Small 
Industrial 
Large      Small 
Consumer 
Large      Small 
IT 
Large      Small 
General Items 79.4% 62.5% 80% 53.9% 63.2% 58.3% 76.9% 70% 
I. Corporate Information 
   Category  
II. Financial and Stock    
     Category  
III. Management and Board of  
      Directors Category 
20% 
 
47.4% 
 
27.2% 
14.7% 
 
42.5% 
 
14% 
20.4% 
 
38.5% 
 
27.6% 
11.5% 
 
31.9% 
 
13.7% 
15.9% 
 
38.6% 
 
22% 
12.5% 
 
39.4% 
 
16.9% 
22.3% 
 
44.4% 
 
29.8% 
14.5% 
 
41.6% 
 
18.5% 
Total Average of I, II, III  34.3% 27.2% 30.4% 21.4% 27.8% 25.9% 34.3% 27.9% 
 40 
that the lower disclosure level by small companies is consistent across different information 
items.  
 
Table 3.9: Disclosure scores for the full sample, large and small companies and the different 
industries 
Percentile Standard
n Mean Min 25% 50% 75% Max Deviation
Full Sample
Disclosure Score 154 26.99 6.00 19.25 27.50 33.00 56.00 10.33
Disclosure Category 1 154 4.64 0.00 3.00 4.00 6.00 19.00 3.01
Disclosure Category 2 154 17.45 4.00 13.00 17.00 22.00 30.00 6.05
Disclosure Category 3 154 4.91 0.00 1.00 4.00 8.00 15.00 4.12
Large Companies
Disclosure Score 78 29.83 10.00 24.00 30.00 36.00 56.00 10.61
Disclosure Category 1 78 5.53 0.00 3.00 5.00 6.75 19.00 3.56
Disclosure Category 2 78 18.15 6.00 14.00 18.00 23.00 29.00 5.66
Disclosure Category 3 78 6.15 0.00 2.00 5.50 10.00 15.00 4.38
Small Companies
Disclosure Score 76 24.08 6.00 17.00 24.00 31.25 45.00 9.24
Disclosure Category 1 76 3.72 0.00 2.00 4.00 5.00 9.00 1.96
Disclosure Category 2 76 16.72 4.00 12.50 16.00 22.00 30.00 6.38
Disclosure Category 3 76 3.63 0.00 1.00 3.00 6.25 12.00 3.41
Industries
Score Healthcare 39 29.00 7.00 21.50 29.00 36.00 48.00 11.15
Score Industrial 39 24.46 6.00 16.00 24.00 32.00 52.00 10.91
Score Consumer 36 25.22 9.00 20.50 25.50 30.25 46.00 8.24
Score IT 40 29.20 11.00 24.75 30.00 35.25 56.00 10.28
 
 
Disclosure Category 1 refers to the Corporate Information category, Disclosure Category 2 is the Financial and Stock 
Information category and Disclosure Category 3 is the Management and Board of Directors category.  
Disclosure score refers to the total disclosure score of all three disclosure categories. Scores of industries refer to the average 
disclosure scores of the companies in each industry.  
 
The industry disclosure score ranking remains stable as previously described. Differences in 
disclosure levels are large in all categories and in all examined industries. The consumer 
industry shows the least level of difference in disclosure level followed by the healthcare 
industry, the IT industry and the industrial goods and services industry. The standard 
deviation of the disclosure score is lower for the small companies indicating less dispersion 
around the mean disclosure score for small companies. This can also be seen in the smaller 
difference between the minimal and maximal disclosure score in the small company sub-
sample. 
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Conclusion 
After examining the current stage of corporate Internet disclosure, we conclude that 
companies provide on their Web site for investors mostly financial information also available 
from other sources. Company specific information such as forward looking information or 
management discussion of past data are difficult to find on the Web sites. We find that only 
6% (table 5 panel C in the appendix) of all 154 companies in our sample provide some kind 
of management forecast information and only 1% of companies provide some kind of 
management discussion of past financial data. There is also very little information about 
strategy, goals or objectives, description of properties or the company’s industry.  
These findings confirm the weaknesses of corporate disclosure identified already in 1994 by 
the Jenkins report or by AIMR (2000). Overall, it seems that the companies’ management did 
not take serious the recommendations made in the Jenkins report to improve the usefulness of 
business reporting. Companies thus do not exploit the full potential of the Internet as a fast 
and cheap medium to disclose useful information to investors. Our results confirm a practical 
test of the Nielson Norman Group, a user-experience research firm, which shows that 
investors were unable to find much of the information they need on corporate IR Web sites. 
Only 21%, for example, were able to find the latest quarterly report, and 50% found the date 
for the next shareholder meeting.  
 
In the next chapter, we examine whether the differences in the disclosure level do have an 
influence on the cost of equity capital and thus an economic consequence.  
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4. Investor Relation Internet Disclosure Level and the 
Cost of Equity Capital 
 
In this study, we investigate the relationship between the disclosure level in the investor 
relation section on corporate Web sites and the cost of equity capital.  This is at the same time 
an indirect test of the usefulness of the information in the investor relation Web site for 
investors. Only if the information is useful, and thus both relevant and reliable, we should 
find a negative relationship between the Internet disclosure level and the cost of equity 
capital.  
We know of no previous research examining this relationship. With this paper, we contribute 
to the academic literature by evaluating the relation between the cost of equity capital and a 
modern way of disclosure. We choose investor relation Internet disclosure because Internet 
communication with investors is gaining more and more on importance, particularly after the 
passage of Reg. FD requiring companies to disclose all material information to all investors 
at the same time. The Internet is the only medium suited for that kind of requirement. 
 
Theoretical evidence suggests a negative relationship between disclosure level and the cost of 
equity capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Empirical research is however confronted 
with major methodological difficulties in developing a measure for the disclosure level and 
the cost of equity capital. Our approach is to estimate the implied cost of capital from market 
prices and analyst earnings forecasts using a comprehensive discounted cash flow model. For 
the disclosure level, we develop our own measure of investor relation Internet disclosure 
based on the content analysis from the previous chapter because no such measure is available 
from professional sources. We then regress the implied cost of equity capital on the 
disclosure level and correct for other potentially influential variables such as firm size and 
different risk factors. 
  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, we review previous research on 
the topic, then present the research design with the sample selection, develop our hypothesis, 
and describe the independent and dependent variables. Finally, we describe the empirical 
implementation of the methodology and show the results.  
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4.1 Review of Previous Research  
As discussed earlier, economic theory suggests a negative relationship between the cost of 
equity capital and the level of corporate disclosure. Empirically, the relation is however still 
open for discussion because of not always consistent results of prior research examining the 
subject. Empirical studies are confronted with two major methodological problems: both the 
disclosure level and the cost of equity capital are difficult to observe and estimate. Given 
these methodological difficulties, the empirical disclosure literature generally examines the 
relationship between the cost of capital and disclosure in two different ways, a direct and an 
indirect way.  
In the indirect way researchers look at the relationship between disclosure level and variables 
that affect the information asymmetry component of the cost of equity capital. As explained 
in the disclosure literature review in chapter 2, the cost of capital includes theoretically a 
component for the information risk for investors; the higher the information asymmetry 
between managers and investors, the higher is this risk component and the higher the cost of 
equity capital. Disclosure should reduce the information asymmetry component of the cost of 
capital and therefore also the cost of capital itself. The information asymmetry component of 
the cost of capital is usually measured with proxies such as the bid-ask spread, trading 
volume, analyst forecast dispersion or share price volatility (Welker, 1995; Healy, Hutton and 
Palepu, 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). These studies, in overall, do support the theory 
that a higher disclosure level reduces information asymmetry.  
The problematic of such an indirect measurement of the relationship between disclosure and 
the cost of capital is that besides the information asymmetry component, there are many other 
factors influencing the cost of capital. These other factors may also be influenced by 
disclosure and are difficult to separately identify and measure. The indirect studies can 
therefore not conclude that the cost of capital is lowered by better disclosure but rather only 
that information asymmetry is reduced which theoretically should lead to lower cost of 
capital. Nevertheless did most authors of prior research adopt the indirect way because 
appropriate cost of equity capital estimates are difficult to obtain. 
 
The direct way does not examine the factors that are positively correlated with the cost of 
capital but rather the cost of capital itself. Examination of the relationship between disclosure 
level and directly estimated cost of equity capital offers the advantage that not only the effect 
but also the magnitude of the effect of disclosure level on the cost of equity capital can be 
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measured. It however requires a quantitative estimate of the difficult to observe cost of equity 
capital. Prior research has measured the cost of equity capital using either ex post or ex ante 
estimates. Using ex post estimates like past returns or the CAPM for the cost of capital is 
however conceptually problematic because they are not forward looking and consequently 
also yielded only disappointing empirical results (Fama and French, 1997; Elton, 1999).  
Advances in model development in recent years allowed the use of the theoretically correct 
ex ante or market implied estimates of the cost of capital. Especially the development of the 
residual income model (RIM) by Ohlson (1995) built the base for a number of different 
research papers examining disclosure and the cost of capital (e.g. Botosan, 1997; Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2000; Hail, 2002; Chen et al., 2003). 
Botosan (1997) was the first to overcome the difficulties of investigating the relationship 
between the cost of capital and disclosure level. She uses a complex version of the residual 
income model to estimate the cost of equity capital and builds her own measure of disclosure 
level based on the amount of voluntary information provided in the annual reports. She finds 
a significant negative relationship between the cost of equity capital and the disclosure level. 
Her results, for a sample of 122 firms from the machinery industry in the year 1990, hold 
however only for firms with low analysts’ following, whereas for firms with high analysts’ 
following she finds no such relation. 
In a comprehensive extension of the research of Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (2000) 
investigate further the relationship between the cost of capital and three different types of 
disclosure provided by AIMR (annual report, quarterly and other published reports, and 
investor relation disclosure) for a larger sample over several years in different industries. For 
the estimation of the cost of equity capital, they use four alternative methods: (1) the classical 
dividend discount model, (2) the residual income valuation model used in Botosan (1997), (3) 
a finite horizon specification of the Gordon growth model (Gordon, 1997), and (4) the 
residual income model described in Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001).  
The results of the study are however mixed. The authors find that the cost of equity capital is 
decreasing in annual report disclosure level at the 5 to 8% level of statistical significance 
after controlling for firm size and market beta. The magnitude of the difference in cost of 
equity capital between the most and least forthcoming firms is approximately 0.5-1%. 
Surprisingly, they find a positive association between the cost of equity capital and the level 
of more timely disclosures such as in the quarterly report. They explain this contrary result 
with the opinion of managers’ claiming that more timely disclosure increase cost of equity 
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capital, possibly through increased stock price volatility. Finally, they find no association 
between the cost of equity capital and the level of investor relations activities. They conclude 
additionally that aggregating across different disclosure types to a measure of total disclosure 
leads to no association with the cost of capital because the relationship depends on the type of 
disclosure. 
Richardson and Welker (2001) examine the relationship between financial and social 
disclosure in Canada. They find that financial disclosure is significant negatively related to 
the cost of equity capital for firms with low analyst following. Contrary to expectations, the 
cost of equity capital is significant positive related to social disclosures.  
Kothari and Short (2003) examine the impact of disclosure on the cost of equity capital 
estimated with the Fama and French three factor model (an ex post proxy for the cost of 
equity capital) in two ways: separating favorable and unfavorable disclosure and segregating 
disclosure by sources (corporate, analysts and business press disclosure). Overall, they find 
that favorable disclosure reduces the cost of capital, while the unfavorable increases it. In 
detail, they find that positive corporate and business press news do not materially affect cost 
of capital while negative news do. The impact of both positive and negative news by analysts 
on the cost of capital was less significant than for the other disclosure sources.  Intuitively the 
results suggest that analysts have a credibility problem or are responding to market changes 
after they have taken place. 
Hail (2002) examines the relationship between the cost of equity capital estimated with the 
residual income model proposed by Gebhardt et al. (2001) and the quality of voluntary 
disclosure provided in the annual report. For a cross-sectional sample of 73 non-financial 
Swiss companies, he finds a negative and highly significant association between the cost of 
equity capital and annual report disclosure. The magnitude is such that the most forthcoming 
firms enjoy about a 1.8% to 2.4% cost advantage over the least forthcoming firms. The 
findings persist after controlling for other potentially influential variables like risk 
characteristics and firm size. Hail concludes that one reason for the stronger relationship in 
Switzerland compared to the US might be the lower overall disclosure level in Switzerland.  
Chen et al. (2003) also examine the relationship between disclosure level and the cost of 
equity capital in a relatively lower disclosure environment compared to the US. They 
examine 545 firm-year observations across Asia’s nine emerging markets in the years 2000 
and 2001. They again find that higher disclosure scores are associated with lower cost of 
equity capital after controlling for factors such as beta or size.  
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We have found no previous study that investigates the relationship between the more modern 
ways of disclosure such as Internet disclosure and the cost of equity capital.  
 
4.2 Research Design and Hypothesis Development  
In this empirical research, we examine the relationship between the disclosure level in the 
investor relation section on a company’s Web site and the cost of equity capital. The 
restriction to this single source of corporate information is because prior research mostly 
evaluated traditional disclosure methods like annual report or financial disclosure and the cost 
of equity capital and found as expected a negative relationship (e.g. Botosan, 1997; Hail, 
2002). The relationship between other disclosure methods and the cost of equity capital is 
however not so clear (Botosan and Plumlee, 2000; Richardson and Welker, 2001).  
To evaluate the modern type of disclosure, we use our own measure of Internet disclosure 
level based on the previous comprehensive content analysis of corporate investor relation 
Web sites of US firms. Our study is also different in respect to estimating the cost of equity 
capital. We use a discounted cash flow (DCF) model as presented in Froidevaux (2004) to 
estimate an ex ante or market implied measure for the cost of equity capital. We choose this 
model because it makes less restrictive assumptions than the standard residual income models 
used in prior research (e.g. Gebhardt, 2001; Hail, 2002). 
Like in most previous research, we use an OLS regression model to examine the relationship 
between the disclosure level and the implied cost of equity capital. We also correct in the 
regression for other potentially influential variables, e.g. risk characteristics and firm size, 
and correct for self-selection bias. In addition, we provide some preliminary evidence on the 
type of disclosure that seems to play an important role in reducing the cost of capital as well 
as on the magnitude of the effect. 
 
Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics for the Sample 
 
Sample Selection 
The researched sample is the one for which we obtained in the content analysis a disclosure 
measure. It consists of 154 non-financial US companies in the following four industries: the 
consumer discretionary, healthcare, industrial goods and services and information technology 
industries. Due to missing data or negative stock prices indicated by the DCF model, the cost 
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of equity capital could not be estimated for 13 companies.9 This reduces our sample to a total 
of 141 companies as presented in table 9 in the appendix.  
The sample is limited to the year 2003 because historical corporate Web sites are not 
available. Prior research however indicates that disclosure policies appear to remain stable 
over time (Botosan, 1997) and thus the one year period is representative for the effect of 
disclosure on the cost of capital.  
Prior research indicates that size is the dominant variable affecting both disclosure and the 
cost of capital. Compared to other studies (e.g. Botosan, 1997 or Hail, 2002), we selected our 
sample as comparable as possible in relation to size and separated in each industry large 
companies from small companies. The differentiation between large and small companies in 
the sample selection process allows us additionally to look at the relationship between the 
cost of capital and disclosure level for large and small company sub-samples separately. We 
believe that it is crucial to correct for size not only in the multiple regression model like most 
of the previous studies, but also already in the sample selection process. The total sample size 
represents a compromise so that the sample would be as large as possible but still comparable 
in terms of size.  
 
Descriptive statistics for the sample 
Descriptive statistics for sample firms is provided in table 10 in the appendix. To ensure 
consistency with our goal of isolating firm size from disclosure level and the cost of capital, 
we present descriptive statistics for the full sample and the two sub-samples of small and 
large companies separately.  
The descriptive statistics show that the two size measures, market value (MVAL) and sales 
(SALES), indicate a substantial cross-sectional variation in firm size between the large and 
small companies. Market value of equity for the full sample ranges from $513 million at the 
first percentile to $223 billion at the 99th percentile of the distribution. Mean market value of 
equity for full sample is $20 billion. Sales for the full sample ranges from $458 million at the 
first percentile compared to $149.8 billion at the 99th percentile of the distribution. Mean 
sales is $12.5 billion.  
                                                 
9
 The excluded companies are one small company in industrial goods and services, three small companies in the 
consumer discretionary industry, and four large and five small companies in the IT industry.  
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Consistent with our research design are the two size measures comparable within the small 
and large companies sub-samples. Large companies have all a market value above $5 billion 
at the 1st percentile and small companies above $500 million. The mean value for market 
capitalization (sales) is $37.5 billion ($23 billion) for large and $856 million ($925 million) 
for small companies. 
 
Risk is another important characteristic for our sample. We use four different risk measures: 
beta, financial leverage, the current ratio and the price-to-earnings ratio. Market beta of the 
stock (BETA) is a measure for systematic risk used in many previous studies investigating 
the cost of equity capital and disclosure level (e.g Botosan, 1997; Chen et al., 2003).  
Financial leverage is defined as the ratio of book value of debt to market value of outstanding 
equity (BVDMVE) because Modigliani and Miller (1958) nominate market leverage, not 
book leverage. The higher a company’s relative debt position, the more likely it will face 
financial distress from defaulting on interest and principal payments and therefore the riskier 
the stock is. The current ratio (CR) is defined as the ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
and is a measure of short-term solvency. The lower the ratio, the higher is a company’s short-
term debt position compared to its short-term assets and therefore the higher is the probability 
of bankruptcy. The price-to-earnings ratio (PER) shows how much investors are willing to 
pay for one dollar of expected future earnings. Many studies have shown that PER is an 
important risk measure as stocks with low P/E ratios had historically higher average returns. 
The lower the ratio, the higher is therefore the risk.    
The descriptive statistics for these measures are provided in table 10 in the appendix. The 
table shows that PER and BETA are comparable in both size sub-samples. The normally 
higher business risk of small companies is thus not reflected in beta; maybe because small 
companies compensate their higher business risk with lower financial risk (lower CR and 
BVDMVE ratios) than large companies. Overall, this makes the large and small sub-samples 
comparable in terms of risk.  
 
The other variables describing our sample are the number of analysts following a specific 
firm (ANALYST) and our measure of Internet disclosure level (INTDISC). Table 10 in the 
appendix shows that the average company in our sample is followed by 14 analysts. An 
average small company is followed by 7 analysts and a large company by 19 analysts. The 
first percentile for analysts following is 2 for small and 6 for large companies.  
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The level of Internet disclosure (INTDISC) is obtained from the content analysis in the 
previous chapter. It ranges for the full sample from a minimum of 6 points to a maximum 56 
points (table 11 in the appendix) showing substantial differences in disclosure across 
companies. The differences in the disclosure are also large in both size sub-samples. For large 
(small) companies the disclosure scores ranges from a minimum of 10 points (6 points) to 
maximum 56 points (45 points). Considering the different disclosure categories in the full 
sample, companies provide on average the most information in the financial and stock 
information category (18 points). The mean disclosure score is much lower at only 5 points in 
the company information and management and board of directors’ category. The companies 
differ also substantially in their disclosure level within the three information categories. The 
scores in the company information category range from a minimum of 0 to maximum 19 
points. The results are similar for the management and board of directors’ category and range 
from 4 to 30 points in the financial and stock category. Complete descriptive statistics for the 
disclosure score is presented in the appendix in table 11.  
Finally, our estimate of the cost of equity capital (IDR) ranges in the full sample from 8.42% 
at the first percentile to 17.95% at the 99th percentile (table 10 in the appendix). This range 
does change for the small respective large companies in such a way that small companies 
have about a one percentage point higher cost of capital in each percentile than the large 
companies. The absolute level of this range seems to be reasonable given historical size 
return premiums considering the fact that the sub-samples are rather comparable in terms of 
risk (see descriptive statistic). The mean (median) value for the full sample is 12.48% 
(12.31%). Given a risk free rate of 4.5% (20 year government bond yield on June 30th 2003), 
this translates into a risk premium of about 8%. This premium lies in line with the historical 
risk premium over the long-term, which is between 7% and 9% (Ibbotson, 2003).  
More detailed descriptive statistics pertaining to the cost of capital is provided in table 12 in 
the appendix.   
 
Hypothesis Development 
As outlined in the review of previous research, economic theory as well as empirical studies 
suggest that higher disclosure levels should be accompanied by lower cost of equity capital. 
We examine this relationship with one special type of disclosure: the information in the 
investor relation section on the companies’ Web sites. This modern type of disclosure needs 
to be examined because the investor relation Web site has become a major tool in 
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communication between the company and its investors. A higher investor relation Internet 
disclosure level should therefore lower the cost of equity capital. Consequently, we test 
empirically the following hypothesis: 
 
H: There is a negative association between the level of disclosure in the investor 
relation section of a company’s Web site and the implied cost of equity capital. 
 
Methodology  
There are two major methodological difficulties in empirically testing the above hypothesis. 
The first difficulty is the measurement and evaluation of the level of investor relation 
disclosure on the companies’ Web sites. We establish our own Internet disclosure level 
measure (INTDISC) based on the content analysis of the investor relation section on 
companies’ Web sites described in the previous chapter. The second major difficulty is to 
estimate the cost of equity capital. We use a comprehensive DCF valuation model as 
presented in Froidevaux (2004) for this purpose.  
Considering previous research, we test our hypothesis by regressing the implied cost of 
equity capital (IDR) on market beta (BETA), the market value of outstanding equity (MVAL) 
and the disclosure score (INTDISC). This leads to the following multiple regression model to 
test our hypothesis: 
iiiii INTDISCMVALBETAIDR εγγγγ ++++= 3210  
 
MVAL is included in the analysis because prior research documents a significant association 
between market value and both the cost of equity capital and the disclosure level (Botosan, 
1997; Hail, 2002). It is included to control for the richness of a firm’s information 
environment. BETA is included into the regression model to control for systematic risk. 
Systematic risk is an essential determinant of the cost of capital and disclosure is one way of 
mitigating such risk. Even though prior empirical research raises doubt about beta as a valid 
risk measure (e.g. Fama and French, 1992; Gebhardt et al. 2001), it is still the most accepted 
systematic risk measure used in the literature. In absence of a better risk-return model, we use 
consistent with all prior research papers on the subject, beta to control for risk10. INTDISC 
                                                 
10
 In a specification test (table 18, panel A in the appendix) we replace beta with other risk proxies such as price-
earnings-ratio (PER) and the ratio of book value of debt to market value of outstanding equity (BVDMVE).   
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refers to the total disclosure score obtained from the content analysis developed in the 
previous chapter. We do not include in the regression analysts following, an important proxy 
for information intermediation, to avoid possible multi-collinearity effects in the multiple 
regressions between analysts following and MVAL (see table 15 in the appendix).  
 
Our regression could suffer from one more problem pointed out by Hail (2002): Lang and 
Lundholm (1993) showed that firms with the highest disclosure ratings tend also to show the 
highest contemporaneous earnings performance. Disclosure is thus not an isolated act but a 
management decision. The management of companies with currently higher performance 
might be more inclined to disclose more information as shown in Marston and Leow (1998) 
and Ashbaugh, Johnstone and Warfield (1999). This fact might result in a self-selection bias 
as firms increase disclosure when they are performing well. Consequently, the association 
between capital market variables such as the cost of equity capital and disclosure may be 
driven by firm performance rather than disclosure per se.  We control for firm performance to 
isolate the impact of disclosure and correct for a potential self-selection bias as suggested in 
Healy et al. (1999). We control in a specification test of the above regression for a firms’ 
performance by including the average ROE of the past five years into the regression equation.  
In another specification test of the regression model, we control also for industry membership 
as both the level of disclosure and the cost of capital are likely to be industry dependent 
(AIMR, 1997; Fama and French, 1997). 
 
Variable Measurement  
Two main variables have to be estimated in our regression model: as independent variable the 
disclosure score (INTDISC) and as dependent variable the cost of equity capital (IDR).  
To assess a firm’s disclosure level we focus on the amount of disclosure provided in the 
investor relation section on the companies’ Web sites. For this reason, we establish our own 
measure of disclosure (INTDISC) based on the disclosure score as presented in the content 
analysis in chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
We estimate the cost of equity capital (IDR) using the comprehensive DCF valuation model 
presented in Froidevaux (2004). Using the model, we compute the cost of equity capital as 
the internal rate of return that equates the intrinsic value of the firm to its current stock price. 
In other words, we estimate the rate of return that the market implicitly uses to discount the 
expected future cash flows of the firm. We estimate the implied rate of return for each firm 
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by substituting the expected cash flows obtained from analysts’ forecasts and the current 
market price into the DCF model and solving the resulting equation using the Excel-solver. 
The measure obtained in this way is used as a proxy for the ex ante or implied cost of equity 
capital.  
All financial data for the DCF model are of December 2002 and obtained from Research 
Insight. Earnings forecasts are of the end of July 2003 and obtained from I/B/E/S within the 
Research Insight database. Beta values as well as market values are both obtained also from 
Research Insight and represent the latest available numbers (June 2003). Prices are of August 
8th 2003 from YAHOOfinance – the day before we started the collection of the information 
on the corporate Web sites. 
 
4.3 Empirical Implementation 
In this chapter, we present in greater detail how we measure empirically the two main 
variables used in our regression model and test their validity. First, the disclosure score is 
discussed followed by the cost of equity capital estimates.  
 
Disclosure Score (INTDISC) 
The purpose of our disclosure score is to measure the level of investor relation Internet 
disclosure. We base the score on all collected information items from the investor relation 
section on corporate Web sites obtained from the content analysis in chapter 3.2. The 
collected items are based on our own criteria found on the Web sites and on criteria suggested 
by previous research (e.g. AICPA, 1994; Botosan, 1997; FASB, 2000; Hail, 2002 or Ettredge 
et al., 2002). In order to establish this disclosure measure we analyze the saved Web sites 
from each of the 154 companies in our sample. The disclosure score is computed for each of 
the companies by awarding points to each information item disclosed in the investor relation 
section. The list of the information items is presented in the appendix table 4. We assigned a 
one (‘1’) if the information item was present in the investor relation section and a zero (‘0’) 
otherwise. The disclosure score is the sum of all points given for each information item from 
the three information categories. General items are excluded from the score because those are 
‘help’ or ‘service’ items that facilitate finding information and do not represent information 
per se. The score is the sum of a total 96 information items divided into three information 
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item categories (see table 4 in the appendix for a detailed list of the categories and items). To 
avoid subjectivity we use no weighting so that every item is equally important. We are not 
using disclosure rank like the previous studies (e.g. Botosan, 1997 or Hail, 2002), but take the 
actual disclosure score as a more sensitive measure of disclosure level.  
Descriptive statistics for disclosure score is provided in the appendix (table 11). 
 
Validity of INTDISC 
Disclosure level is not easily assessed because the development of a disclosure measure relies 
heavily on a person’s subjective perception. In our case, we mitigate this problem by 
including in our disclosure score as much information as possible available in the investor 
relation section on the corporate Web site.  
We assess the validity of our measure of disclosure level (INTDISC) in two different ways: 
(1) since reporting strategies are a management decision and coordinated within the 
company, the components of our different three disclosure categories should exhibit a 
positive relationship with one another (Lang and Lundholm, 1993), and (2) the disclosure 
score should be associated with other firm characteristics identified in prior research that 
proxy for disclosure level. We use the results of a Pearson correlation coefficient analysis and 
different regressions presented in table 4.1 and 4.2 to address these issues.  
 
First, we examine the relationship between the overall company disclosure score INTDISC 
and its three disclosure components (INTDISC1, INTDISC2 and INTDISC3).11 Each 
correlation coefficient is positive showing that the information categories are indeed highly 
correlated with each other. The significance is tested in  regressions using the three categories 
as independent variables and the total measure of the three categories as dependent variable. 
Table 4.1 shows that the categories are not only positively related to each other but the 
relationship is also highly significant at more than the 1% level of statistical significance. 
This first test thus confirms the validity of our disclosure score. 
In the second test, we examine several other variables where a relationship with disclosure 
level has already been shown empirically. Like Debreceny, Gray and Rahman (2002), we 
find a significant positive relationship between our Internet disclosure measure (INTDISC) 
                                                 
11
 INTDISC1 refers to the Corporate Information category, INTDISC2 to the Financial and Stock category and 
INTDISC3 to the Management and Board of Directors category. 
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and market value (MVAL) (see table 4.2) and no relationship between INTDISC and the 
price-to-book value ratio, firm’s beta and book value of debts to market value of equity. As 
shown in table 4.2, we however find a significant positive relationship between INTDISC and 
return on equity (ROE). Lang and Lundholm (1993) show that firm performance and 
disclosure are positively related. Trading volume and analysts following are also significantly 
related to INTDISC but could not be included into the multiple regression because of multi-
collinearity with market value. 
The level of statistical significance of the ROE variable can be increased to 1% in the simple 
regression and to 2.5% in the multiple regression by substituting disclosure score with 
disclosure rank used in previous studies (table 13 panel B in the appendix).  
Therefore, the results of the two tests confirm that our measure of disclosure is valid and that 
it can be used in the regression model to test our hypothesis. 
 
Table 4.1: Internal consistency of the disclosure score: Pearson correlation coefficients and p-values  
Variable INTDISC INTDISC1 INTDISC2 INTDISC3
INTDISC 1 0.673 0.851 0.782
p-value 0 0.000 0.000 0.000
INDISC1 1 0.342 0.453
p-value 0 0.000 0.000
INDISC2 1 0.437
p-value 0 0.000
INDISC3 1
p-value 0
***  
***  
***  ***  
***  
***  
 
*** indicates 1% statistical significance in the direction predicted. For description and measurement of INTDISC, 
INTDISC1, INTDISC2 and INTDISC3 see pages 91-92.  
 
Table 4.2: Disclosure score and firm characteristics related to disclosure 
Intercept MVAL ROE Adj. RSQ
(+) (+)
Panel A: Simple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 9.290 4.929 0.130
P-Value 0.019 0.000
Coefficient 25.252 9.746 0.029
P-Value 0.000 0.023
Panel B: Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 8.911 4.639 6.875 0.142
P-Value 0.024 0.000 0.092
***  
***  *
**  
 
***, **,*, indicates 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance in the direction predicted. For description and measurement of 
MVAL and ROE see pages 91-92. 
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Implied cost of equity capital (IDR) 
The cost of equity capital may be viewed as a summary measure of risk as perceived by 
equity investors (Gode and Mohanram, 2001) and is therefore the critical link between stock 
prices and risk. The theoretical best method to estimate the cost of equity capital is 
consequently a market-based ex ante measure. Consistent with most prior research, we 
therefore use a model that allows the determination of a market implied cost of equity capital.  
Only a discounted cash flow (DCF) model can provide us with such an estimate. DCF models 
define the intrinsic value of common stock as the present value of its expected future cash 
flows. The value of common stock is therefore determined by the stream of expected cash 
flows in the nominator and the required rate of return or discount rate in the denominator of 
the DCF model. The DCF model is expressed mathematically as follows:  
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V0= Value of the stock in t=0 
CF = cash flow generated by the asset for the owner of the asset in period t, 
k = discount rate or cost of equity capital 
n = number of years over which the asset will generate cash flows to investors 
 
The implied cost of capital can be calculated by substituting cash flow forecasts and the 
current stock price into the above equation and then by solving for the discount rate. The 
result is an estimate for the cost of equity capital implied in current market prices.  
 
The valuation literature (e.g. Stowe et al., 2002) proposes three different specifications of 
DCF models: dividend discount models (DDM), discounted free cash flow models (DFCF) 
and residual income models (RIM). They are all equivalent from a theoretical point of view 
and differ only in the definition of the relevant cash flow to discount (Lundholm and 
O’Keefe, 2001a, b). 
Theoretically, the dividend discount model is often considered the most correct valuation 
model (Miller and Modigliani, 1961) but it is difficult to use in praxis because dividend 
forecasts are not directly available as analysts provide only earnings forecasts. Thus, one 
needs to introduce difficult assumptions about payout policies to forecast dividends. This is 
not attractive for two reasons. First, such payout assumptions are rarely empirically 
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descriptive, and second, given the Modigliani-Miller theorem, dividend policies should not 
affect market values.  
Even though the dividend discount model and discounted free cash flow models (DFCF) are 
mathematically equivalent, DFCF models are more appealing than the dividend discounting 
models because they relate cash flows to stock prices with less restrictive assumptions.  
Although dividends are the cash flows actually paid out to stockholders, the free cash flow 
models are based on the cash flow available for distribution but not actually distributed to 
shareholders. Free cash flow (FCF) is the cash flow available to the company’s owners after 
all operating expenses (including taxes), interest, and principal payments have been paid and 
the necessary investments in working capital and fixed capital have been made (Damodaran, 
2001). It is called ‘free’ cash flow to signal that it is the amount of money free to distribute to 
equity investors without cannibalizing the future of the business.  
Recently much of the research into the relation between market values and accounting 
numbers has used the residual income model (RIM) of Ohlson (1995) or its different versions 
based on the same principle. This is not different in the cost of capital literature. Many 
researchers (e.g. Botosan, 1997; Claus and Thomas, 1998; Botosan and Plumlee, 2000; 
Gebhardt et al., 2001; Gode and Mohanram, 2001) used RIM to estimate the implied cost of 
capital. At its theoretical core, residual income models relate market values to current book 
values plus the net present value of expected future residual income. Residual income is net 
income less a charge for common shareholder’s opportunity cost in generating this net 
income (the cost of capital). It is based on the premise that in order to create value for its 
owners a firm must earn more on its total invested capital than the total cost for that capital.  
 
With the increasing popularity of the concept, a lot of empirical research has been done on 
the relative attractiveness of the various DCF models. The models are conceptually 
equivalent but empirical studies that examine the relative superiority show mixed results on 
what model is practically the most valid. Bernard (1995), Penman and Sougiannis (1998), 
Francis et al. (2000) and Frankel and Lee (1998) show that the residual income models 
predict and explain stock prices better than the models based on discounting dividends or 
cash flows. On the other hand, empirical studies by Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1999), Morel 
(1999), Myers (1999), Callen and Morel (2001) provide evidence that the residual income 
approach is of limited empirical validity. Plenborg (2000) concludes that in some cases the 
residual income approach yields more accurate firm value estimates while in others the 
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discounted cash flow approach is better depending on the degree of simplifying assumptions 
introduced into the various models. 
In relation to estimating the cost of capital with the residual income model, most studies show 
that the model produces too low estimates for the cost of capital. Gebhardt et al. (2001) find 
for example a market implied risk premium that is around 2.5% compared to the historical 
average of 8% (Ibbotson, 2003). Other authors find even lower values (e.g. Claus and 
Thomas, 2001) and some even values close to zero (Fama and French, 2001; Jagannathan et 
al., 2001). The biggest problematic however is that the Gebhardt el al., (2001) paper 
representing “the state of the art in the literature” (Gode, 2001) in estimating the implied cost 
of equity capital with a RI model fails to document the validity of the RI model. They find for 
example in the multivariate analysis a positive (and not negative) but insignificant 
relationship between the cost of capital and size. The dispersion of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, a measure of business risk, is significant but also with the intuitively wrong sign. 
This raises doubts about the ability of the model to provide a valid ex ante estimate for the 
cost of equity capital. 
Although conceptually superior in relation to financial market based research, little evidence 
exists on the empirical performance of DFCF models. It was used only very recently in 
serious tests. Froidevaux (2004) shows that a comprehensive DFCF model can explain stock 
prices within a 10% range of market values and that it can be used in an investment strategy 
to generate substantial abnormal returns in the US stock market. Furthermore Lee, Ng and 
Swaminathan (2003) find DFCF model to be a valid method to estimate the ex ante cost of 
capital.  
 
Considering the mixed empirical evidence on the relative superiority of the different 
valuation models, Rappaport and Mauboussin (2001) conclude that the long-term discounted 
free cash flow model captures the pricing mechanism of the stock market best because it 
directly reflects the cash flow available for distribution. Residual income models, on the other 
hand, rely on transformations of the original principle of discounted cash flow what makes it 
less useful in praxis. Residual income models are indeed not used very often in praxis. A 
survey of Demirakos, Strong, and Walker (2002) shows that 36% of all analysts’ reports they 
analyzed used DFCF model and only 2% of the analyzed reports used RIM.  
Given the conceptual advantages of the DFCF model and the rather mixed empirical evidence 
regarding the RIM, we use in our study the discounted free cash flow approach. To estimate 
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the implied cost of equity capital, we adopt a version of the DFCF model presented in 
Froidevaux (2004). It is a spreadsheet-based comprehensive three-stage DFCF model that 
requires a lot of input data. It might therefore not be useful for large sample tests but for our 
sample of 141 companies it is well suited. That the degree of detail of a valuation model is 
important is shown in Sorensen and Williams (1985). They find that the intrinsic value 
estimates, and therefore also the cost of capital estimates, obtained from a valuation model 
improves considerably as the complexity of the valuation model used increases. Botosan and 
Plumlee (2000) find already a much simpler discounted dividend model to be useful in 
estimating the cost of capital. We believe therefore that the comprehensive model presented 
in Froidevaux (2004) provides even better estimates. The model we use is shortly described 
below. For a more detailed discussion of the model see Froidevaux (2004). 
 
The DFCF model of Froidevaux (2004) 
The DFCF model presented in Froidevaux (2004) assumes three stages based on findings of 
Sharpe, Alexander and Baily (1999) showing that economic growth falls generally into three 
stages: an initial growth period, a transition growth period and a long term mature growth 
period.  
In the model, the initial growth period ranges between five and 15 years and requires a 
specific earnings forecast in the first two years and then a growth rate for earnings and other 
variables such as depreciation and amortization, capital expenditure and change in working 
capital for the remainder of the period.  
After this initial period, the company’s growth rate is expected to revert to the average 
growth rate of the economy. The economic law of diminishing returns and many empirical 
studies such as Little (1962) or Lev (1983) showed that a company cannot grow for extended 
periods of time faster than the industry in which it operates. This indicates that for most 
companies sales growth will eventually decelerate to the nominal GDP growth level what is 
captured in the intermediate fading period in the second stage of the model. Growth rates are 
faded from the forecasted first stage level to the stable long-term growth stage level.  
The third and final long-term growth stage assumes that the company has reached its maturity 
stage and will grow only as fast as the general economy from there on until infinity, assuming 
though a going concern.  
The sum of the discounted cash flows in all three stages equals the fair value of the stock.  
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Mathematically the model of Froidevaux (2004) looks as follows12; a graphical overview of 
the model is presented in the appendix, table 14.  
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where 
P0 = Value of the stock in t=0 
FCFE1 = Free cash flow to equity in year 1 
FCFE2 = Free cash flow to equity in year 2 
FCFEt = Free cash flow to equity in year t 
k = Discount rate 
n = Year ending stage 1 
N= Year ending stage 2; (N-n) is the length of stage 2 
M = Year ending stage 3; (M-N) is the length of stage 3 
 
Implementing such a comprehensive DCF valuation model is accompanied by three major 
difficulties: (1) the relevant cash flow has to be defined, (2) cash flow growth rates need to be 
estimated, and (3) the length of each growth stage (the cash flow growth duration) has to be 
determined.  
 
1. The relevant cash flow 
As discussed earlier, the free cash flow is the relevant cash flow to discount in a DCF model. 
More specifically are we using the free cash flow to equity (FCFE) measured in the way 
proposed in Damodaran (2004): 
Earnings per share 
+/- Change in working capital * (1-debt financing proportion of working capital) 
+ Depreciation & amortization * (1-debt financing proportion of depreciation  
& amortization)  
- Capital expenditures * (1-debt financing proportion of capital expenditure) 
= Free Cash Flow to Equity 
 
                                                 
12
 The model presented in Froidevaux (2004) uses actually different discount rates in the three different stages. 
As we later solve for the discount rate we must assume only one discount rate for all stages. 
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For calculating FCFE, the earnings are very important as they account usually for the biggest 
portion of the final FCFE estimate and are the starting base for the earnings growth rate. We 
use an average of the realized earnings per share (EPS) from Research Insight and the 
consensus EPS forecast for one year ahead discounted for the forecasted earnings growth rate 
to better reflect repeatable rather than transitory EPS.  
To these earnings, the change in working capital must be added or subtracted.  This depends 
on whether more or less capital must be tied in the business to be used for future economic 
growth. Only the part financed by equity investors (1-debt financing proportion of working 
capital) will affect the free cash flow available for shareholders. In case the company finances 
the increase in working capital with more debt, no additional equity capital is needed and 
nothing will be subtracted.  
To obtain free cash flow to equity, we further need to add back the non-cash expenses such as 
depreciation and amortization and subtract future capital expenditure needs. The difference 
between capital expenditure and depreciation and amortization is the amount of net 
investment needed to continue or grow the operations of the business. Like before only the 
part financed by equity investors will reduce the free cash flow to equity.  
 
2. The growth rate of FCFE 
We use analysts’ forecasts of long-term earnings growth obtained from I/B/E/S as our 
earnings growth rate estimate for the high growth phase. Many researchers (e.g. Collins and 
Hopwood, 1980; Fried and Givoly, 1982; Brown and Rozeff, 1978) looked at analysts 
earnings forecasting capabilities compared to mechanical models and the results of their 
studies confirm that analysts are better forecasters than mechanical models, particularly in the 
short term. In the second phase of the model, earnings growth is not estimated anymore 
directly as no such forecasts are usually available from analysts. Instead a sustainable profit 
margin is estimated based on the average profit margin in the high growth phase. The profit 
margin from the end of the high growth phase is faded linearly to the sustainable profit 
margin over the length of the fading period. The growth rate for the stable third phase is 
assumed to be the average of the historic GDP growth and the historic earnings growth rate, 
both obtained from the bureau of economic activity. 
The growth rates of the other components of FCFE, such as depreciation and amortization, 
capital expenditure and working capital are estimated based on averages of the latest five year 
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historical data and extrapolation of historical relationships between sales, capital expenditure, 
depreciation and working capital.  
 
3. Cash flow growth duration 
Another very important issue is the time horizon of expected growth. We use the same 
approaches as in Froidevaux (2004). He uses in his model three different methods to 
determine the duration of the first growth stage: (1) a relative growth duration approach, (2), 
an absolute growth duration approach, and (3) an economical growth duration approach. The 
first two approaches are derived from market prices and the third from fundamental variables.  
The relative growth duration approach answers the question of how long the earnings of a 
growth company must grow at the expected high rate relative to a stock in the stable growth 
period (usually an index like the S&P500) to justify its prevailing P/E ratio. The relative 
growth duration concept was suggested by Holt (1962). He showed that if equal risk between 
a given security and a market security is assumed, the differences in P/E ratios can be 
explained by differential growth rates. Given the growth rates, the method of Holt allows the 
quantification of the length of the growth phase the market implies in the growth stock. 
The absolute growth duration approach is suggested in Damodaran (2004) and calculates the 
cash flow growth duration as the number of years the company needs to grow free cash flow 
at the higher rate until the present value of all future cash flows equals the current market 
price of the stock.   
The economical growth duration approach is conceptually based on Porter’s (1980) work on 
competitive advantage. This approach uses economic factors that indicate in what life cycle 
the firm currently is, to find out how long it can be expected to continue growing at a higher 
rate. The economic factors used in Froidevaux (2004) are firm size, current earnings growth 
rate, ROE, P/E and PBR ratios etc. The approach assumes that the further away a company’s 
economic factors are from the norm (in our case the S&P 500), the more time the factors need 
to approach this norm and the longer the company can grow at a higher rate. 
 
The total length of the high growth phase has been fixed at a minimum of five years and a 
maximum of 15 years based on findings of Dechow (2001). The length of the second stage is 
determined in relation to the length of the first growth stage adjusted with ratios that proxy 
for the competitive situation of the company (e.g. sales growth, ROE, PBR). The minimum 
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fading period length is three years, the maximum 10 years. The length of the third stage has 
been fixed by Froidevaux (2004) at 150 years. He argues that this time period is a valid proxy 
for the theoretical infinite life of a company because in the third stage the discount rate is 
always higher than the FCFE growth rate. This leads to present values of future cash flows 
that are approaching zero before the end of the 150 years. 
 
Validity of the Implied Cost of Equity Capital Estimates 
To test the validity of our estimates of the implied cost of equity capital measure obtained 
from the model presented in Froidevaux (2004), we examine the relationship between the 
cost of capital and different firm characteristics related to the cost of capital. We test several 
firm characteristics and find that market capitalization (MVAL), book value of debt to market 
value of equity (BVDMVE), the current ratio (CR) and the price-to-earnings ratio (PER) are 
all significantly related to our measure of cost of capital.13  However only MVAL, CR and 
PER are statistically significant also in the multiple regression (see table 4.3). Pearson 
correlation coefficients for the variables examined are provided in table 15 in the appendix. 
 
Table 4.3: Implied cost of equity capital and firm characteristics 
Intercept MVAL BVDMVE CR PER Adj. RSQ
(-) (+) (-) (-)
Panel A: Simple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.1074 -0.0076 0.0628
P-Value 0.0000 0.0016
Coefficient 0.0774 0.0065 0.0231
P-Value 0.0000 0.0397
Coefficient 0.0860 -0.0041 0.0230
P-Value 0.0000 0.0399
Coefficient 0.0910 -0.0006 0.0599
P-Value 0.0000 0.0020
Panel B: Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.1235 -0.0088 0.0046 -0.0041 -0.0004 0.1472
P-Value 0.0000 0.0004 0.1310 0.0642 0.0710
***
***
**
*
***
**
*
 
***, **,*, indicates 1%, 5%, and 10% significance in the direction predicted. For description and measurement of MVAL, 
BVDMVE, CR and PER see pages 91-92. 
 
                                                 
13
 To minimize the influence of outliers when examining the relationship between these variables and the cost of 
capital, the book value of debt to market value of equity ratio and the current ratio is winsorized at the upper and 
lower 1% of observations and the price-to-earnings ratio at 5%.   
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Market capitalization (MVAL) is a measure of size and size has been shown to be one of the 
strongest determinants of the cost of equity capital (Gebhardt et al., 2001); small companies 
have higher cost of capital than large companies. Book value of debt to market value of 
equity (BVDMVE) is a measure for financial leverage. The higher the leverage, the higher is 
the risk and thus the higher the discount rate should be (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). 
Bhandari (1988) and Fama and French (1992) document empirically a positive relationship 
between leverage and stock returns. Similarly, the current ratio (CR) is a measure for short-
term solvency. The higher the ratio, the higher is the financial risk of the company and the 
higher the discount rate should be. The price-to-earnings ratio (PER) has been shown for 
many years to be related to stock market returns. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), 
and Dreman (1998) show that low P/E stocks earn positive abnormal returns relative to the 
market and high P/E stocks negative abnormal returns. Many authors (e.g. Fama and French, 
1992) hypothesize therefore that PER is a risk proxy; the lower the ratio the higher the returns 
and therefore theoretically the higher the risk. 
The results of our regression analysis thus validate our cost of capital measure. 
 
We also test the relationship between beta and the cost of capital as beta is considered an 
important measure of systematic risk. We find that beta is not related to the cost of capital 
and does not even behave as predicted in the simple regression. Prior research papers 
however also had difficulties documenting this relationship empirically. Our results are 
comparable to those of Gebhardt et al. (2001) who also find a negative relationship between 
cost of capital and market beta even though the CAPM suggests an opposite relationship. 
Gebhardt et al. (2001) conclude that beta is only of limited importance in the market’s 
assessment of a stock’s systematic risk. In our case, the relationship between beta and cost of 
capital might be explained in part by the large number of small companies in the sample. The 
beta of small companies has long been viewed with skeptic by practitioners. Jegadeesh 
(1992) however finds a negative relationship between beta and realized returns even after 
adjusting for size.  
Another explanation is related to deficiencies in the beta measure itself. Already in 1992 
Fama and French (1992) conclude about beta that: “our tests do not support the most basic 
prediction of the SLB [Sharp-Lintner-Black CAPM] that average stock returns are positively 
related to market betas”. The authors examine the relationship between betas and realized 
returns between 1963 and 1990 and find, like we, a negative but not significant relationship.  
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Another indicator for the validity of our cost of capital measure is the magnitude of the risk 
premium obtained from the cost of capital measure. Assuming a risk free rate of 4.5% (the 20 
year US government bond at the end of June 2003), our average cost of capital measure of 
12.5% indicates a risk premium of 8%. This is comparable to historical risk premium 
estimates. Ibbotson (2003) suggests that the historic equity risk premium lies in the region of 
7-9% per year, depending on the specific data series examined. Being objective, the strength 
of this historic evidence has convinced many that the Ibbotson estimate is the best available 
proxy for the equity premium (Welch, 2000).  
Prior researchers had much more difficulties finding a valid cost of capital measure. For 
example, the mean value of the cost of capital in Hail (2002) is only 6.18% while in Botosan 
(1997) it is 20.1%. Compared to those estimates our cost of capital appears to be reasonable 
which confirms the validity of our cost of capital measure. 
 
4.4 Empirical Results  
The results of our study for a sample of 141 non-financial US companies in four different 
industries in 2003 show a negative and highly significant relation between the implied cost of 
equity capital and the level of investor relation Internet disclosure. The results hold after 
taking into account other firm characteristics such as firm size and different risk measures. 
After correcting for self-selection bias, the relationship remains stable at the same level of 
statistical significance.  
In more detail, we now first present the results of the regression model for the full sample of 
large and small companies together, followed by the results for the large and small companies 
separately, and the results in relation to each disclosure category as well as to each industry.  
 
Empirical Results of the Regression Model of the Main Hypothesis 
In our study, we examine the relationship between the implied cost of the equity capital and 
the investor relation section disclosure level. For this purpose, we formulated the following 
hypothesis (see chapter 4.2): 
H: There is a negative association between the level of disclosure in the investor 
relation section of a company’s Web site and the implied cost of equity capital. 
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We conducted a simple and multiple regression analysis to test this hypothesis empirically. In 
both regressions, we find a highly significant negative relationship between the cost of equity 
capital and the investor relation section disclosure level. The results of the simple regression 
in table 4.4 panel A suggest that for all 141 companies in the sample, the cost of capital is 
negatively associated with the Internet disclosure level at the 1% level of statistical 
significance.  
The simple regression results should however be interpreted cautiously as we do not correct 
for differences in firm characteristics. To correct for these, we test our hypothesis also by 
regressing the implied cost of equity capital (IDR) on market beta (BETA), the market value  
of equity (MVAL) and the Internet disclosure score (INTDISC). This leads to the following 
multiple regression model: 
iiiii INTDISCMVALBETAIDR εγγγγ ++++= 3210  
 
The results of this multiple regression are presented in table 4.4 panel B confirm the result of 
the simple regression that the cost of capital is negatively related to the investor relation 
section disclosure level. The results are only slightly less significant at the 1.6% level of 
statistical significance. 
 
Table 4.4: Simple and multiple regression results of the implied cost of equity capital on disclosure 
score (full sample)14  
Intercept INTDISC MVAL BETA Adj. RSQ
(-) (-) (+)
Panel A : Simple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.094433431 -0.000545295 0.056368
P-Value 1.67233E-38 0.002657664
Panel B: Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.093902928 -0.000464253 -5.87155E-08 -0.000604 0.053981
P-Value 9.28979E-34 0.015549486 0.204494944 0.861026
***
**
 
***, **, indicates 1%, and 5% significance in the direction predicted. For description and measurement of MVAL, BETA, 
and INTDISC see pages 91-92. 
 
Table 4.4 shows that the coefficients of INTDISC and MVAL behave as predicted. We note 
however that our size adjustment variable MVAL is not significant in the multiple regression. 
                                                 
14
 Technically, the intercept coefficients relate in all results to the risk premium and not to the cost of equity 
capital. 
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We attribute this to other omitted variables in the regression and to the fact that market value 
is correlated with the cost of capital as well with disclosure (table 15 and 13 in the appendix). 
By examining a less sensitive disclosure measure such as INTDISCMOD in a specification 
test (see table 18, panel E), we find that size becomes significant at 5% while increasing the 
statistical significance of the disclosure score. 
Again, beta is not significant in the regression and does not behave as predicted. This is 
however not surprising because we did not find a significant relationship between beta and 
the cost of capital previously. Our result is consistent with prior research, which raised doubt 
about the validity of beta as a risk measure (e.g. Gebhardt et al., 2001). In a later specification 
test, we substitute beta with leverage (BVDMVE) and the price-to-earnings ratio (PER) to 
control for risk and find these variables to be significant (table 18, panel A in the appendix). 
 
The coefficient on our disclosure score indicates the presence of about a 46 basis point (BP) 
cost difference for a disclosure score difference of 10 points. The 50 disclosure point 
difference between the most and the least forthcoming firms15 would thus translate into a 
difference in the cost of equity capital of 2.32%. These findings are not only statistically 
significant but also economically relevant.  
According to Bushee and Leuz (2003) “disclosures reduce the firm’s cost of capital only if it 
is useful and not self-serving”. Our results thus implicitly show that the information in the 
investor relation section is useful and thus reliable and relevant for investors. The results 
indicate that a company could possibly reduce its cost of equity capital by 0.5% by, for 
example, providing a detailed biography of the executives and the board of directors.  
By looking at the individual information categories, we can further see what kind of 
information is the most useful and has the strongest relationship with the cost of capital. 
 
Empirical Results for the Individual Disclosure Categories 
In the following, we provide some evidence on the type of Internet disclosure that seems to 
play an important role in reducing the cost of equity capital.  
The INTDISC1, INTDISC2 and INTDISC3 coefficient values in table 4.5 indicate that the 
Company Information category (represented by the variable INTDISC1) reduces the cost of 
                                                 
15
 See the difference between the minimum and maximum disclosure score (full sample) in table 3.9 in chapter 
3.3 
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capital the most, followed by the Management and Board of Directors category (variable 
INTDISC3). The difference in the disclosure level between the most and least forthcoming 
firms in the Company Information category results in a difference in the cost of capital of 
2.64%. In the Management and Board of Directors category, the same cost reduction would 
be 1.65%. The results of the relationship between the Financial and Stock Information 
category (variable INTDISC2) and the cost of equity capital are negative but not significant, 
showing that this kind of information provided in the investor relation section is the least 
useful to investors. One explanation here could be that financial and stock information are 
easily available from other sources while company and management information is more 
difficult to find anywhere else. Problematic is this fact because we find in the content analysis 
of the previous chapter that both large and small companies do best in providing information 
in exactly the Financial and Stock Information category having now the least influence on the 
cost of capital. In other words, companies provide the most information in the category that is 
the least useful to investors. 
 
Table 4.5: Regression of the implied cost of equity capital on market value, beta and the three 
different disclosure category scores 
Intercept MVAL BETA INTDISC1 INTDISC2 INTDISC3 Adj. RSQ
(-) (+) (-) (-) (-)
Panel A: Simple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.08759 -0.00169 0.04631
P-Value 0.00000 0.00597
Coefficient 0.08964 -0.00058 0.01641
P-Value 0.00000 0.06994
Coefficient 0.08613 -0.00131 0.05038
P-Value 0.00000 0.00430
Panel B: Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.08823 -6.16E-08 -0.00098 -0.00139 0.04516
P-Value 0.00000 0.18711 0.77793 0.03222
Coefficient 0.09076 -8.46E-08 -0.00136 -0.00048 0.02864
P-Value 0.00000 0.06076 0.69542 0.13406
Coefficient 0.08624 -5.99E-08 0.00007 -0.00110 0.04811
P-Value 0.00000 0.19950 0.98450 0.02521 **
**
***
***
*
*
**
 
***, **,* indicates 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance in the direction predicted. For description and measurement of 
MVAL, BETA, INTDISC1, INTDISC2 and INTDISC3 see pages 91-92.  
 
Considering these results, companies should provide more information from the Corporate 
Information category and Management and Board of Directors Information category (listed in 
table 4, panel A and C in the appendix) in the investor relation section to lower their cost of 
capital. As an example, a company could lower its cost of capital by as much as 1% by 
providing a general description of the business including its business units together with its 
objectives and strategy and a list with description of its products and services.  
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Empirical Results of the Regression Model for the Sub-Samples of Large and Small 
Companies 
After having found a significant relationship between the cost of equity capital and the level 
of Internet disclosure for the full sample, we now look at this relationship for large and small 
companies separately.  
For the large company sub-sample the simple regression indicates a negative relationship 
between disclosure level and the cost of capital, significant at the 5% level (table 4.6 panel 
A). In the multiple regression that adjusts for size (MVAL) and beta (BETA), the results are 
negative as well but significant only at 7.6%. That the relationship is less significant than for 
the full sample could be partly explained by the fact that the size of the sample is reduced by 
half. The significance level could however be increased to 4% by simply excluding the three 
auto companies from our large company sub-sample (table 16 in the appendix). These 
companies have all high disclosure scores but due to the cyclical nature of their businesses 
very high cost of capital and are thus distorting the relationship between the two variables in 
the sample.  
The coefficient of the disclosure variable INTDISC are similar to the ones from the full 
sample and thus the magnitude of the relationship is comparable to the magnitude of the full 
sample.  
 
The results of the sub-sample of small companies are negative but not significant in the 
simple and multiple regression (table 4.6 panel B). Those weaker results might explain why 
small companies provide less information; for them the benefit in terms of lower cost of 
capital might not outweigh the cost of disclosure (including the proprietary costs). The cost of 
capital of such firms is determined more by other factors such as business or financial risk or 
the quality of management rather than their level of Internet disclosure.  
Not surprisingly is the magnitude of the effect lower as well. A 10 point increase in 
disclosure would only result in a 25 BP reduction in the cost of capital. Given the already 
higher cost of capital for small firms, this effect is rather neglectable.  
It might however also be that for small companies a similar relationship between the 
disclosure level and the cost of capital exists as for large companies but that our cost of 
capital measure is less valid for small companies. It proved to be difficult to estimate the cost 
of capital for small and volatile companies. 
 69 
Table 4.6: Multiple regression of implied cost of capital on market value, beta and disclosure score 
for the large and small company sub-samples 
 
Panel A: Sub-sample of large companies
Intercept INTDISC MVAL BETA Adj. RSQ
(-) (-) (+)
Simple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.091093543 -0.000517231 0.043831
P-Value 6.79617E-18 0.04063629
Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.088936282 -0.000471727 -3.61504E-08 0.002566 0.026604
P-Value 4.26158E-15 0.07636725 0.486293543 0.625562
Panel B: Sub-sample of small companies
Intercept INTDISC MVAL BETA Adj. RSQ
(-) (-) (+)
Simple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.093205778 -0.000379364 0.011521
P-Value 2.57909E-19 0.188119576
Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.106851271 -0.0002514 -1.58551E-05 -0.003767 0.038437
P-Value 1.06512E-15 0.387925823 0.077683707 0.406833
**
*
*
 
 
**,* indicates 5% and 10% statistical significance in the direction predicted. For description and measurement of MVAL, 
BETA and INTDISC see pages 91-92. 
 
Overall, our findings are surprising considering the results in Botosan (1997). She actually 
finds the opposite disclosure effect: small companies (companies with low analysts 
following) show a significant relationship between the cost of capital and the disclosure level 
while large companies do not. This contradiction could be partly explained by the different 
type of disclosure examined. Botosan focused on disclosure in annual reports while we 
examined information in investor relation sections of corporate Web sites. For small 
companies the annual report could be the best and most reliable source of information while 
for large companies additional information on the Web site seems to be more important for 
investors.  
These explanations are however rather hypothetical and our results are based on rather small 
samples. The importance of sample size is also illustrated by the fact that when the entire 
industrial goods and services industry is excluded from the small firm sub-sample, the results 
become again statistically significant at 5% (see appendix, table 17). This industry was the 
only one showing a positive relationship between the cost of equity capital and the disclosure 
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level. We can partly explain this fact with a double outlier in this industry: the company with 
the second highest disclosure score has also the second highest risk premium. Excluding only 
this company would again confirm our previous negative relationship between the Internet 
disclosure level and the cost of capital in the industrial industry (although not at an acceptable 
level of statistical significance). This fact highlights the importance of large sample tests to 
show a reliable relationship between two sensitive variables such as the cost of capital and 
disclosure.  
 
Specification Tests 
Having noticed the sensitivity of the examined relationship between the disclosure level and 
the cost of equity capital, we make different specification tests to determine the stability and 
thus the quality of the previous results for the full sample. To do this, we modify our previous  
regression model in five different ways: (1) by replacing BETA with different risk measures 
in the multiple regression, (2) by including industry membership (INDUM) in the regression, 
(3) by including return on equity (ROE) into the multiple regression to adjust for self 
selection bias, (4) by using disclosure rank (INTDISCRANK) instead of disclosure score, (5) 
by looking at above/below average disclosure (INTDISCMOD) rather than the disclosure 
score.  
 
In the first specification test, we examine the effect of the risk adjustment factor. We find in 
the validity test of the cost of capital estimates that beta is not statistically significant related 
to our measure of the cost of equity capital (IDR); the coefficient does not even have the right 
direction. Even though there are explanations for that fact, we examine the effect of replacing 
BETA with risk variables that have shown a significant relationship to our cost of capital 
measure: financial leverage (BVDMVE) and the price-to-earnings ratio (PER). The results 
are insensitive to these changes in the multiple regression and remain statistically significant 
at around the 1.5% level with a very similar coefficient for INTDISC (table 18 in the 
appendix, panel A).  
In the second specification test, we test the effect of industry membership (INDUM) on the 
relationship between cost of capital and disclosure level. Prior research (e.g. AIMR, 1997; 
Gebhardt, 2001) shows that both disclosure level and the cost of capital is industry 
dependent. As in Gode et al. (2001), we thus include the average risk premium for each 
industry into the original multiple regression model to correct for industry membership. The 
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additional adjustment for industry membership does not affect the coefficient or the level of 
statistical significance of the main hypothesis test (table 18 in the appendix, panel B).        
The third specification test corrects the relationship for self-selection bias. Companies that 
have currently good financial results might be tempted to disclose them more openly while 
companies with currently bad financial results tend to hide them more than disclose them 
creating a selection bias in the data. We correct for self-selection bias as indicated in Healy 
and Palepu (2001) by including ROE into the regression model. The results are however 
again not impacted by the adjustment in a meaningful way (appendix table 18, panel C). 
In the forth specification test, we measure the level of disclosure differently. Like in previous 
research (e.g. Botosan, 1997 and Hail, 2002) we rank the disclosure score and regress the cost 
of equity capital on the disclosure rank (INTDISCRANK) rather than the score itself. 
Measuring disclosure level with rank instead of score reduces the sensitivity of the disclosure 
measure. The results improve in both the simple and the multiple regression and become 
significant at the 1% level (table 18 in the appendix, panel D). We can however now only 
conclude that by improving its disclosure rank, a company can reduce the cost of capital.   
In the fifth and final specification test, we replace the disclosure score with an even less 
sensitive measure of disclosure level than disclosure rank, determining only whether a 
company has above or below average disclosure (INTDISCMOD). It therefore shows 
whether above (below) average disclosure results in lower (higher) cost of equity capital. 
This measure is rather insensitive to outliers and thus examines whether the good results 
found in the main hypothesis test are caused by only a few outliers. The results do not 
confirm this. The direction remains the same and the level of statistical significance increases 
to 1% (table 18 in the appendix, panel E). Now even our size measure (MVAL) is significant 
in the multiple regression. In addition, by replacing beta (BETA) with the price-to-earnings 
ratio (PER) also our risk adjustment variable becomes significant (table 18 in the appendix, 
panel E) so that all variables in the multiple regression are now significant at 5% or better. 
 
Overall, the specification tests show a remarkable stability of the results. The first three tests 
show that the relationship remains stable for different specifications of the adjusting variables 
in the regression model. The last two specification tests indicate that the relationship between 
the cost of equity capital and Internet disclosure level is also robust for changes in the 
disclosure measure. For these reasons, the Internet disclosure level should be considered to be 
statistically negative significant related to the implied cost of equity capital for the companies 
in our sample. 
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Industry Results 
The main objective of this study was to examine the relationship between disclosure level and 
the cost of equity capital for the whole sample and not necessarily for the industry specific 
sub-samples. The industry samples are too small (between 31-39 companies, see table 9 panel 
B in the appendix) to show any level of significant relationship.  
Nevertheless, we examine the relationship between the cost of equity capital and disclosure in 
the four different industries. Interesting is the fact that for each industry, the relationship 
between cost of capital and disclosure level is indeed negative in both simple and multiple 
regression models (table 4.7). Few results are however significant at a scientifically 
acceptable level. 
 
Table 4.7 Regression of the implied cost of capital on market value, beta and the industry disclosure   
scores  
Intercept MVAL BETA INTDISCH INTDISCC INTDISCI INTDISCIT Adj. RSQ
(-) (+) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Panel A: Simple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.0935 -0.0004 0.0508
P-Value 0.0000 0.0898
Coefficient 0.1055 -0.0008 0.0457
P-Value 0.0000 0.1216
Coefficient 0.0862 -0.0006 0.0408
P-Value 0.0000 0.1174
Coefficient 0.1019 -0.0008 0.0731
P-Value 0.0000 0.0768
Panel B: Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.0991 -3.41E-08 -0.0118 -0.0004 0.0624
P-Value 0.0000 0.5251 0.1602 0.1278
Coefficient 0.1042 -8.02E-08 0.0033 -0.0008 -0.0156
P-Value 0.0000 0.8019 0.7869 0.1266
Coefficient 0.0779 -8.02E-08 0.0096 -0.0004 0.0436
P-Value 0.0000 0.3905 0.2526 0.2926
Coefficient 0.1090 -1.19E-07 -0.0063 -0.0006 0.0652
P-Value 0.0000 0.3190 0.3984 0.1999
*
*
 
* indicates 10% statistical significance in the direction predicted. For description and measurement of the MVAL, BETA, 
INTDISCH, INTDISCC, INTDISCI and INTDISCIT see pages 91-92. 
 
Table 4.7 shows that disclosure has the most influence on the cost of equity capital in the 
consumer discretionary and IT industry. This fact indicates that especially companies in the 
consumer discretionary industry should improve their disclosure. Currently their disclosure 
level is among the lowest of the industries examined while they would profit the most by 
increasing it. The relatively high coefficient of the IT industry helps explain why IT 
companies provide the most information as found in our content analysis study. The reward 
of disclosing more in that industry is above average. 
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5. Results, Implications and Limitations  
Empirical research into the relation between disclosure level and the cost of equity capital is 
limited because the disclosure level and the cost of equity capital are difficult to measure 
reliably. Nevertheless, we find our measures for both, the disclosure level of the investor 
relation section and the cost of equity capital to be valid. The results also make sense 
conceptually and economically: as hypothesized, we find a highly significant negative 
relationship between our estimation of the cost of equity capital and the level of investor 
relation Internet disclosure. These results indicate that the information in the investor relation 
section on the corporate Web sites are on average useful to investors. 
  
5.1 Summary and Interpretation of Results 
In this dissertation, we examine investor relation Internet disclosure. For that purpose, two 
studies were made: the content analysis to examine what kind of information companies 
make available on their Web sites, and the cost of capital study where we regress the cost of 
equity capital on a disclosure measure based on the content analysis. 
 
In the content analysis study, we investigated which information large and small US 
companies, representing four different industries, provide on their Web sites to investors. The 
results show a rather disappointing level of disclosure as only about 31.7% (25.6%) of the 
examined information is provided on average by large (small) firms. Furthermore, companies 
provide more information that is easily available from other sources such as stock related or 
financial information and neglect company specific information such as management 
discussion and outlook information where they are the best and sometimes the only 
information source. Company overview, products and services and operations are other 
poorly provided information sub-categories in the investor relation section despite the fact 
that this kind of information is important to investors (AICPA, 1994). 
 
On the defense of the companies must be said that we only examined information in the 
investor relation section of corporate Web sites. Some companies provide more information 
in other sections of their Web sites that could also be useful to investors. It would be however 
better to prepare information especially for investors as they are interested in more specific 
corporate disclosure than other users of corporate Web sites.  
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The fact that almost all companies provide the annual report and SEC fillings in the investor 
relation section of their Web sites furthermore shows that more information is actually 
available than we examined. Companies could however with only a little more effort enhance 
their Internet disclosure by using the available technological tools (like an annual report in 
HTML) to link the information in the annual report onto their investor relation Web site and 
thus facilitate the accessibility of the information. 
From the content analysis, we conclude that companies provide some useful information to 
investors on the Web sites. More effort on providing information and an increased use of 
available technology would however further enhance the usefulness of Internet reporting.  
 
The disclosure score from our content analysis allows us to build a disclosure measure for the 
level of Internet disclosure to investors (INTDISC). This measure is used in a second study to 
empirically test the relationship between the cost of equity capital and the Internet disclosure 
level. The results of such a test ultimately determine whether Internet disclosure is useful to 
investors; only if disclosure is reliable and relevant, it will have an economic impact on the 
firms cost of equity capital. 
Using simple and multiple regression models we find as expected a negative and highly 
significant association between the two variables for a cross-sectional sample of 141 non-
financial US firms. The magnitude is such that the most forthcoming firms enjoy about a 
2.32% cost advantage over the least forthcoming firms. The findings persist even after 
controlling for other potentially influential variables such as risk characteristics and firm size. 
Furthermore, after adjusting for self-selection bias the results remain stable.  
The results are surprisingly strong in both statistical significance and magnitude considering 
that US companies are not especially suited for an analysis of this kind because US firms 
operate in an already rich disclosure environment making it harder to document such a 
relationship empirically (Hail, 2002; Botosan, 1997, Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). We explain 
the better results with the quality of our measure of disclosure level. Internet disclosure is still 
not regulated and companies are free to provide on their Web site whatever information they 
believe is useful to investors. This seems to make the information more user focused and 
therefore more useful for investors and furthermore results in large differences in disclosure 
across companies. Another reason for the stronger relationship in our study could be that 
professional investors and analysts rely more on the information on the investor relation Web 
sites than on annual report disclosure. So finds a survey by Kraker & Company in 2001 that 
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81% of analysts visit a company’s Web site at least weekly. This may contribute to the 
stronger relationship of internet disclosure and the cost of equity capital. 
Even though the goal of this dissertation was to examine the relationship between disclosure 
quantity and the cost of equity capital, our results show that the disclosed information is also 
of some quality for investors, otherwise it would not lower the cost of capital. The content 
analysis study however showed that there is still much room for improvement in corporate 
Internet disclosure. 
 
5.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
The content analysis is subject to two limitations. First, the data collected from Web sites is 
to a certain degree dependent on our own browsing experience. Some Web sites are large and 
contain many interlinked sections so that it proved difficult to distinguish exactly which 
information belongs to the investor relation section. To solve this problem, we collected all 
visible information and information for which existed a visible link to this information in the 
investor relation section. Some companies provide links to entirely new Web sites for 
subsidiaries or certain products and services. In this case, we assumed that the Web site 
contains all our information items in the product category such as the list or description of 
products and services. Although we did our best to include all information for investors, we 
may have inadvertently missed some data. However, where omissions appeared significant, 
the Web sites were rechecked and reviewed again.  
The second limitation is the list of researched items from the investor relation section, which 
could be a subject to a selection bias. We mitigated this problem by including as many items 
in our list as was possible to collect. Even though some companies provide information that is 
difficult to classify, we partly corrected for that limitation by including summary measures 
into our list of information items such as ‘industry specific information’. We believe that our 
disclosure measure is comprehensive enough to reflect the current state of corporate Internet 
reporting for investors in the US.   
Although the study is a subject to these limitations, we have empirically shown in this 
dissertation that our disclosure measure is valid. 
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There are also some limitations pertaining to the second study examining the empirical 
relationship between investor relation Internet disclosure level and the cost of equity capital 
that needs to be discussed. The first limitation is related to the DCF model that is used to 
estimate the market implied cost of equity capital. The model is detailed and therefore 
requires many historical and forward looking input factors. At the time of our study, the US 
economy was about to recover from a recession and going out from a severe bear market. 
This led to problems in the consistency of the inputs to the DCF model; it proved very 
difficult to correctly determine the normal level of earnings, sales or level of profit margins in 
this economic transition period.  
A further limitation is the sensitivity of the results of the regression to extreme values of the 
cost of equity capital. We retested our main hypothesis by modifying the sample size and find 
in some cases much lower significance levels. Specifically, we excluded from the sample the 
10 companies with the highest and the 10 companies with the lowest cost of capital. Although 
the lower significance level is to some degree normal, our results should be interpreted with a 
certain degree of caution as the sample size may be too small.  
Another reason why the results should be interpreted with caution is the low adjusted R-
square in the regression results. The R-square values of 5-12% show that there is still 
substantial portion of the variation in the cost of capital unexplained by the explanatory 
variables of our regression. This could be a sign of noise in the cost of capital measure or 
caused by omitted variables in the regression. The magnitude of the R-squares is however 
comparable to previous studies examining disclosure and the cost of capital (e.g. Botosan, 
1997).   
The examination of a single market and an only one-year research period is a further 
limitation. Although we believe, based on previous research, that the relationship between the 
cost of equity capital and the disclosure level is rather stable across space and time, we 
cannot generalize our results for other markets and other time horizons.  
A fourth limitation is the way we weighed the information items to obtain our disclosure 
score. All items are equally weighted meaning that all information items are assumed to be of 
the same degree of importance for investors. Even though a chart is not of equal importance 
to an investor as an annul report, disclosing every smallest detail indicates an overall attitude 
of management to disclosure which we capture with this research design.  
A related limitation of our study is that we examine the relation between the cost of equity 
capital and disclosure quantity and not disclosure quality. Evaluating the quality of 
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information for investors is however problematic in absence of a reliable disclosure quality 
measure. For example, only an expert who follows the company and its industry can evaluate 
the relevance of the provided information for the specific company. Beattie and Pratt (2002) 
conducted a survey of the perceived usefulness of 130 information items by four groups of 
experts. They find that “the four groups’ overall level of agreement on the usefulness of the 
130 items varied considerably”. It is therefore difficult to correctly determine the usefulness 
of information. In relation to the reliability of the information would even auditors have 
difficulties in evaluating certain qualitative information. It is however likely that the quality 
and quantity of information are positively related (Ettredge, Richardson and Scholz, 1999) 
because of the importance of managers’ reporting reputation and the possibility of legal 
liability. Examining disclosure quality should furthermore only strengthen the negative 
relationship between cost of capital and disclosure.  
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Given the large cross-sectional differences in the amount of disclosure in the investor relation 
section documented in this dissertation, future research should determine what information 
should be provided for investors in the investor relation section on corporate Web sites. In 
our opinion, ‘best practices’ would help companies in providing the information investors 
find useful. Such general and industry specific ‘best practices’ for relevance and reliability of 
information must however be first established. The Jenkins Report (1994) or the IASC (1999) 
report are steps in the right direction. We believe that such ‘best practices’ should be based 
on studies of investment approaches and surveys of investors’ needs for information. Best 
practices would not only increase the relevance but also the comparability of the information 
across companies and thus the usefulness of information provided for investors on the 
Internet would increase.  
Another issue that should be addressed in the future is the problem related to the reliability of 
Internet disclosure. For example, the information provided within annual reports is usually 
considered more reliable because independent parties have audited it. This is not the case for 
Internet disclosure as companies provide hyperlinks to mostly unaudited information and 
even to information from third parties. This provides a potential loophole that could mislead 
users of information (Hodge, 2001). A first step in this direction is the recently establish 
Office of Internet Enforcement by the SEC dedicated exclusively to Web surveillance and 
enforcement. 
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Our main recommendation for future research on the subject of disclosure and market 
variables such as the cost of capital is that researchers should make a distinction between the 
quantity and the quality of disclosure. What actually influences all market variables is not the 
amount of provided information but its importance to investors. The disclosure quality could 
be measured for example by weighting the importance of each information item or with an 
assessment of the actual information content of the disclosed item. This should be done 
industry specific and be based on investor’s perception of the relevance and reliability of each 
information item.  
 
In summary, companies currently do not exploit the full potential of the Internet as a modern 
medium for investor relations. Future research should not only give companies the necessary 
tools for providing the right and reliable information but also a proof that increasing 
disclosure is actually beneficial not only for the investor, but also for the company. The 
impact of disclosure on the cost of capital is unfortunately not the end issue. Even though 
disclosure lowers the cost of capital, it is more important to understand the impact of 
disclosure on firm value over the long term. Management might assume that lower cost of 
capital enhances firm value and therefore that more disclosure is beneficial for a company. 
They should however not ignore the potential cost associated with increased disclosure. In a 
valuation model the cost of capital increases firm value only if the cash flows until infinity 
are stable or not decreasing as much to offset the beneficial impact of a lower discount rate. 
This however cannot be the case because, as discussed earlier, disclosure has its costs and 
therefore impacts future cash flows. Here future research should test empirically how Internet 
disclosure or disclosure in general is related to the market value of a company. This is the real 
and most important test of whether higher disclosure level is actually benefiting current 
investors. To do this, future research should examine the monetary costs of increased 
disclosure. Especially the proprietary cost, such as the cost of competitive disadvantage is an 
important research topic. For management, especially of small companies, improving the 
content of information included in investor relation section inevitably means facing difficult 
cost-benefit decisions. They thus need concrete investigation on both the costs and benefits of 
increased disclosure. 
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Appendix  
 
Variable description and measurement: 
 
ANALYST The number of analysts following a company as of the end of July 2003 
obtained from Research Insight 
BETA   Market beta as of June 2003 obtained from Research Insight  
BVDMVE The ratio of book value of long-term debt to market value of equity measured 
by market capitalization obtained from Research Insight for the fiscal year 
2002 and winsorized at the upper and lower 1% of observations  
CAPEX Capital expenditure for the fiscal year 2002 obtained from Research Insight 
CR The ratio of current assets to current liabilities obtained from Research 
Insight for the fiscal year 2002 and winsorized at the upper and lower 1% of 
observations  
D&A Depreciation and amortization obtained from Research Insight for the fiscal 
year 2002 
DFP Debt financing proportion; DFP for D&A and capital expenditure is the 
average debt-to-asset ratio of the past 5 years; DFP for working capital is the 
average current ratio of the past 5 years. All data are obtained from Research 
Insight 
FCFE   Free cash flow to equity calculated as described in chapter 4.3 
IDR Implied discount rate obtained from the discounted free cash flow to equity 
model 
INDUM Industry membership: average of the risk premium of the firms in the same 
industry 
INTDISC Overall Internet disclosure score for a company as of August 11th 2003 
calculated as the sum of all points in the three information categories 
obtained from the content analysis study 
INTDISC1  Internet disclosure score for the Corporate Information category  
INTDISC2  Internet disclosure score for the Financial and Stock Information category 
INTDISC3 Internet disclosure score for the Management and Board of Directors 
category 
INTDISCC Internet disclosure score for companies in the consumer discretionary 
industry   
INTDISCH Internet disclosure score for companies in the healthcare industry 
INTDISCI Internet disclosure score for companies in the industrial goods and services 
industry 
INTDISCIT Internet disclosure score for companies in the information technology 
industry  
INTDISCMOD    Internet disclosure score modified to measure above/below average 
disclosure 
INTDISCRANK  Internet disclosure rank is the fractional rank of the firms disclosure score 
MVAL Market value of outstanding equity as of June 2003 in $ millions measured by 
market capitalization obtained from Research Insights 
n    Number of observations 
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P                                     Price obtained from Yahoofinance.com as of August 8th 2003 
PER Price-to-earnings ratio calculated with prices obtained from 
Yahoofinance.com and forward earnings obtained from IBES and winsorized 
at the upper and lower 5% of observations  
ROE Return on equity obtained from Research Insight for the fiscal year 2002, 
winsorized at 1% to correct for outliers. 
SALES   Sales obtained from Research Insight for the fiscal year 2002 in $ millions 
VOLUME Trading volume as of June 2003 obtained from Research Insight 
 
 
Notes:  
1. All disclosure scores are measured from August 9-11, 2003 
2. Technically, the intercept coefficients relate in all regression results to the risk premium and 
not directly to the cost of equity capital. 
3. ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance in the direction predicted using a 
t-test. 
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APPENDIX FOR THE INVESTOR RELATION CONTENT ANALYSIS STUDY 
 
Table 1: Companies included in the sample 
 
Panel A: Summary of Sample Selection Process 
Number Percent
Total Firms at the beginning 160 100%
Firms for which disclosure score could not be calculated -6 3.75%
Total of Firms Researched in the Study 154 96.25%
 
 
Panel B: Number of Companies in Relation to Size and Industry Membership 
Large Small Total
Healthcare 20 19 39
Industrial Goods and Services 20 19 39
Consumers Discretionary 18 18 36
Information Technology 20 20 40
All Companies 78 76 154
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 94 
 
Table 2: Size criteria for sample selection  
 
Companies Large Small 
(in billion USD) (in million USD)
Healthcare Industry
MVAL >$4 $500-$1700
SALES >$3 $400-$1700
Consumer Discretionary Industry
MVAL >$4.8 $500-$1000
SALES >$5 $500-$1500
Industrial Goods and Services Industry
MVAL >$6 $500-$1000
SALES >$6 $500-$1750
Information Technology Industry
MVAL >$5 $500-$1500
SALES >$4.3 $460-$1700
 
For variable description and measurement, see pages 91-92 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for sample firms  
 
Percentile Standard
Variable n Mean 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% Deviation
Full Sample
MVAL 154 18852 517 811 5013 18694 208061 40963
SALES 154 9485 459 844 3126 10446 73999 16037
Large Companies
MVAL 78 36366 5110 10293 18654 30272 273516 52005
SALES 78 17825 3187 8421 10357 19841 92571 19187
Small Companies
MVAL 76 878 503 651 808 991 1733 315
SALES 76 924 451 610 832 1188 1675 349
Healthcare Industry
MVAL 39 27833 533 854 5335 21864 225476 54222
SALES 39 9076 447 830 3012 15961 45903 11864
Consumer Discretionary 
MVAL 36 8848 523 705 2995 11731 53940 13163
SALES 36 4623 544 832 4770 8421 8421 3855
Industrial Goods and Services
MVAL 39 17798 530 748 6431 16731 204826 46649
SALES 39 12208 556 1026 6270 13959 101571 22542
Information Technology
MVAL 40 20129 549 914 4848 19497 139991 35589
SALES 40 11603 466 862 2993 15294 75897 18149
 
For variable description and measurement, see pages 91-92 
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Table 4: Results overview of Information Items and General Items for full sample and sub-
samples of all large and all small companies 
 
Panel A: Results General Items and Corporate Information category 
CONTENT ANALYSIS 154 78 76
RESULTS Average All Average Large Average Small
A All Items Scores 32 36 29
B General Items Scores 5 6 5
C Information Items Scores 27 30 24
Correlation between B and C 50.01% 42.42% 48.13%
TOTAL INFORMATION ITEMS PROVIDED IN (%) 28.7% 31.7% 25.6%
GENERAL ITEMS
1 Link to IR section 86% 86% 86%
2 Site map 50% 59% 41%
3 Search box 55% 71% 39%
4 Contact (email, telephone, headquarter's address, etc) 92% 92% 92%
5 Email alert service 66% 71% 61%
6 Information request 65% 72% 58%
7 Webcasts 61% 67% 55%
8 Other shareholder services 72% 85% 59%
(Dividend reinvestment plan, Investment calculator, Transfer agent, 
Tax information, Glossary, Electronic dividend deposit etc.)
8 Total 68.3% 75.2% 61.3%
Nr. INFORMATION ITEMS
I Corporate Information Category 16.6% 19.7% 13.3%
1 Company Overview
1 General description of the companys' business 62% 56% 68%
2 Company's history 14% 23% 4%
3 Company's strategy 8% 12% 5%
4 Company's broad goal or objectives 5% 5% 4%
5 List of business units or organizationalal chart 17% 23% 11%
6 Description of business units 12% 15% 9%
7 Industry specific information 3% 5% 0%
17.3% 20.0% 14.5%
2 Products & Services
8 List of principle products and services 16% 18% 13%
9 Description of principle products and services 7% 12% 3%
10  Discription of the users of the products 2% 4% 0%
11 List of principle brands, registered trademarks 2% 4% 0%
12 Principle markets 15% 18% 12%
13 New products 2% 4% 0%
14 List of suppliers 1% 1% 0%
6.3% 8.6% 3.9%
3 Operations 
15 Description of property, plants and equipment 2% 3% 1%
16 Technology and innovation, (R&D) 7% 10% 4%
17 Partners 3% 4% 3%
18 Distribution channels 1% 1% 0%
19 Manufacturing or service production 1% 1% 0%
2.7% 3.8% 1.6%
4 News
20 News 87% 90% 84%
21 Archived news 75% 74% 75%
22 Earnings releases 31% 46% 16%
23 Historical earnings releases 19% 24% 14%
24 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) 49% 59% 39%
52.3% 58.7% 45.8%
5 Sustainability Information
25 Economic sustainability information (wages, job creation,etc) 5% 10% 0%
26 Environmental information 6% 12% 0%
27 Social information (health and safety, contributions) 6% 12% 0%
28 Commitment to stakeholders, mission 6% 6% 7%
28 5.8% 9.9% 1.6%
 
Continued next page 
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Panel B: Results Financial and Stock category 
 
II Financial and Stock Category 40.6% 42.2% 38.9%
1 Main Financial Information
29 Balance sheet or highlightst 29% 27% 32%
30 Income statement or hightlights 34% 33% 36%
31 Cash flow statement or hightlights 27% 24% 30%
32 Historical financial statements 3% 5% 0%
33 Annual report 92% 94% 91%
34 Historical annual report 75% 82% 68%
35 Quarterly report or quarterly financial statements 28% 35% 21%
36 Historical quarterly report or quarterly financial statements 25% 29% 20%
39.2% 41.2% 37.2%
2 SEC Fillings 
37 Form 10K 97% 97% 97%
38 Form 10Q 96% 96% 96%
39  Form Section 16 or link to it 91% 91% 91%
40 Link to SEC fillings 27% 28% 26%
41 Archived SEC fillings 94% 92% 95%
81.0% 81.0% 81.1%
3 Other Financial Information
42 Data summary 12% 13% 12%
43 Financial highlights 40% 45% 36%
44 Important financial ratios 34% 27% 41%
45 Segment data 12% 19% 5%
46 Historical segment data 5% 8% 3%
47 Debt information 3% 6% 0%
48 Dividend information 45% 53% 37%
49 Dividend history 27% 47% 7%
50 Company's investments (e.g. acquisitions) 6% 8% 5%
20.6% 25.1% 16.1%
4 Analysts Information
51 Analysts' forecast estimates 28% 24% 32%
52 Analysts' recommendations 20% 17% 24%
53 List of analysts 55% 47% 63%
54 Contact to analysts 29% 19% 38%
55 Calender of events 64% 74% 53%
56 Analysts' presentations 48% 56% 39%
57 Archieved analysts' presentations 23% 36% 11%
58 Conference calls 53% 46% 61%
59 Archived conference calls 21% 21% 22%
38.0% 37.9% 38.0%
5 Stock Information
60 Ticker symbol 84% 86% 82%
61 Stock exchanges on which company is registered 83% 82% 84%
62  Stock quotes 83% 87% 79%
63 Charts 73% 79% 67%
64 Historical price lookup or link to it 58% 67% 49%
65 Stock split information 23% 41% 5%
66 Stock repurchase information 3% 4% 3%
67 List of major shareholders 4% 4% 4%
68 Number of shares held by institutions 26% 21% 32%
69 Number of shares held by management 6% 3% 11%
70 Market capitalization 32% 24% 41%
71 Insider transactions 22% 17% 28%
43 41.6% 42.8% 40.2%
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Panel C: Results Management and Board of Directors category 
 
III Management and Board of Directors Category 21.3% 26.8% 15.8%
1 Management Discussion of Past Data and Outlook
72 Management forecast or outlook 6% 9% 3%
73 Management discussion of past financial data 1% 3% 0%
3.6% 5.8% 1.3%
2 Executives and Management 
74 List of executives and management 58% 60% 55%
75 Age of executives and management 4% 6% 1%
76 Experience of executives and management 40% 37% 42%
77 Education of executives and management 32% 32% 33%
78 Compensation of executives and management 3% 3% 3%
27.3% 27.7% 26.8%
3 Board of Directors
79 List of Board of Directors members 55% 59% 50%
80 Age of Board of Directors members 12% 21% 3%
81 Experience of Board of Directors members 34% 33% 36%
82 Education of Board of Directors members 18% 14% 22%
83 Other current jobs of Board of Directors members 27% 33% 21%
84  Directors compensation 1% 1% 0%
24.5% 26.9% 21.9%
4 Corporate Governance
85 Committees information 23% 32% 14%
86 Committees charter 24% 36% 12%
87 Corporate governance guidelines 34% 51% 16%
88 Code of conduct and ethics 29% 44% 14%
89 Proxy statement 51% 74% 26%
90 Directors independence standards 6% 8% 4%
91 Transactions or/and relations among related parties 1% 1% 0%
92  Certification (CEO, CFO) 10% 15% 4%
93 Certification of incorporation 10% 19% 1%
94 By-law 13% 23% 3%
23 20.1% 30.4% 9.5%
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Table 5: Results overview of Information Items and General Items for all companies, industry 
averages 
 
Panel A: Results General Items and Corporate Information category 
 
CONTENT ANALYSIS 39 39 36 40
RESULTS Avg Health Avg Industrial Avg Consumer Avg IT
A All Items Scores 35 30 30 35
B General Items Scores 6 5 5 6
C Information Items Scores 29 24 25 29
Correlation between B and C 42.99% 59.55% 50.61% 41.92%
TOTAL INFORMATION ITEMS PROVIDED IN (%) 30.9% 26.0% 26.8% 31.1%
GENERAL ITEMS
1 Link to IR section 92% 85% 83% 83%
2 Site map 59% 44% 33% 63%
3 Search box 62% 59% 22% 75%
4 Contact (email, telephone, headquarter's address, etc) 92% 90% 89% 98%
5 Email alert service 72% 67% 56% 68%
6 Information request 59% 72% 67% 63%
7 Webcasts 62% 56% 67% 60%
8 Other shareholder services 72% 67% 69% 80%
(Dividend reinvestment plan, Investment calculator, Transfer agent, 
Tax information, Glossary, Electronic dividend deposit etc.)
8 Total 71.2% 67.3% 60.8% 73.4%
Nr. INFORMATION ITEMS
I Corporate Information Category 17.4% 16.0% 14.2% 18.4%
1 Company Overview
1 General description of the companys' business 72% 49% 58% 70%
2 Company's history 8% 15% 14% 18%
3 Company's strategy 8% 8% 11% 8%
4 Company's broad goal or objectives 3% 10% 0% 5%
5 List of business units or organizationalal chart 13% 23% 14% 18%
6 Description of business units 10% 18% 8% 13%
7 Industry specific information 0% 3% 0% 8%
16.1% 17.9% 15.1% 19.6%
2 Products & Services
8 List of principle products and services 31% 10% 3% 18%
9 Description of principle products and services 13% 5% 3% 8%
10  Discription of the users of the products 8% 0% 0% 0%
11 List of principle brands, registered trademarks 0% 0% 6% 3%
12 Principle markets 15% 18% 17% 10%
13 New products 8% 0% 0% 0%
14 List of suppliers 0% 0% 0% 3%
10.6% 4.8% 4.0% 5.7%
3 Operations 
15 Description of property, plants and equipment 3% 3% 3% 0%
16 Technology and innovation, (R&D) 10% 5% 0% 13%
17 Partners 8% 0% 0% 5%
18 Distribution channels 0% 0% 0% 3%
19 Manufacturing or service production 0% 0% 0% 3%
4.1% 1.5% 0.6% 4.5%
4 News
20 News 87% 85% 94% 83%
21 Archived news 74% 74% 86% 65%
22 Earnings releases 26% 36% 14% 48%
23 Historical earnings releases 13% 15% 8% 40%
24 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) 54% 44% 42% 58%
50.8% 50.8% 48.9% 58.5%
5 Sustainability Information
25 Economic sustainability information (wages, job creation,etc) 5% 8% 3% 5%
26 Environmental information 5% 8% 6% 5%
27 Social information (health and safety, contributions) 5% 8% 6% 5%
28 Commitment to stakeholders, mission 10% 5% 3% 8%
28 6.4% 7.1% 4.2% 5.6%
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Panel B: Results Financial and Stock category 
 
II Financial and Stock Category 45.0% 35.3% 39.0% 43.0%
1 Main Financial Information
29 Balance sheet or highlightst 36% 21% 25% 35%
30 Income statement or hightlights 49% 23% 25% 40%
31 Cash flow statement or hightlights 36% 21% 25% 28%
32 Historical financial statements 0% 0% 0% 10%
33 Annual report 95% 85% 92% 98%
34 Historical annual report 77% 72% 81% 73%
35 Quarterly report or quarterly financial statements 26% 26% 28% 33%
36 Historical quarterly report or quarterly financial statements 13% 23% 28% 35%
41.3% 33.7% 37.8% 43.8%
2 SEC Fillings 
37 Form 10K 100% 95% 100% 98%
38 Form 10Q 100% 95% 94% 98%
39  Form Section 16 or link to it 95% 85% 94% 90%
40 Link to SEC fillings 28% 33% 22% 28%
41 Archived SEC fillings 97% 90% 94% 95%
84.1% 79.5% 81.1% 81.5%
3 Other Financial Information
42 Data summary 10% 18% 6% 15%
43 Financial highlights 38% 49% 36% 38%
44 Important financial ratios 49% 28% 31% 28%
45 Segment data 13% 15% 8% 13%
46 Historical segment data 15% 3% 0% 3%
47 Debt information 3% 8% 0% 3%
48 Dividend information 56% 38% 44% 40%
49 Dividend history 25% 30% 22% 30%
50 Company's investments (e.g. acquisitions) 0% 0% 3% 23%
23.3% 21.0% 16.7% 21.1%
4 Analysts Information
51 Analysts' forecast estimates 38% 23% 28% 23%
52 Analysts' recommendations 33% 15% 17% 15%
53 List of analysts 59% 41% 56% 65%
54 Contact to analysts 38% 18% 25% 33%
55 Calender of events 69% 49% 67% 70%
56 Analysts' presentations 54% 38% 36% 63%
57 Archieved analysts' presentations 21% 21% 25% 28%
58 Conference calls 54% 56% 58% 45%
59 Archived conference calls 31% 15% 22% 18%
44.2% 30.8% 37.0% 39.7%
5 Stock Information
60 Ticker symbol 87% 72% 86% 90%
61 Stock exchanges on which company is registered 87% 67% 89% 90%
62  Stock quotes 87% 64% 94% 88%
63 Charts 79% 54% 75% 85%
64 Historical price lookup or link to it 72% 41% 58% 60%
65 Stock split information 23% 18% 17% 35%
66 Stock repurchase information 5% 0% 0% 8%
67 List of major shareholders 5% 0% 3% 8%
68 Number of shares held by institutions 46% 18% 11% 28%
69 Number of shares held by management 5% 0% 14% 8%
70 Market capitalization 44% 31% 25% 30%
71 Insider transactions 36% 21% 14% 18%
43 48.1% 32.1% 40.5% 45.4%
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Panel C: Management and Board of Directors category 
 
III Management and Board of Directors Category 20.7% 20.8% 19.4% 24.1%
1 Management Discussion of Past Data and Outlook
72 Management forecast or outlook 0% 8% 6% 10%
73 Management discussion of past financial data 0% 0% 3% 3%
0.0% 3.8% 4.2% 6.3%
2 Executives and Management 
74 List of executives and management 59% 56% 61% 55%
75 Age of executives and management 0% 3% 6% 8%
76 Experience of executives and management 41% 26% 50% 43%
77 Education of executives and management 33% 21% 33% 43%
78 Compensation of executives and management 3% 0% 6% 3%
27.2% 21.0% 31.1% 30.0%
3 Board of Directors
79 List of Board of Directors members 56% 54% 47% 60%
80 Age of Board of Directors members 10% 13% 8% 15%
81 Experience of Board of Directors members 31% 33% 36% 38%
82 Education of Board of Directors members 15% 18% 17% 23%
83 Other current jobs of Board of Directors members 28% 15% 25% 40%
84  Directors compensation 0% 0% 0% 3%
23.5% 22.2% 22.2% 29.6%
4 Corporate Governance
85 Committees information 23% 26% 22% 23%
86 Committees charter 21% 26% 19% 30%
87 Corporate governance guidelines 33% 41% 17% 43%
88 Code of conduct and ethics 26% 36% 19% 35%
89 Proxy statement 51% 59% 42% 50%
90 Directors independence standards 5% 8% 3% 8%
91 Transactions or/and relations among related parties 0% 3% 0% 0%
92  Certification (CEO, CFO) 10% 8% 8% 13%
93 Certification of incorporation 15% 10% 11% 5%
94 By-law 15% 18% 8% 10%
23 20.0% 23.3% 15.0% 21.5%
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Table 6: Information items in order of percentage provided by all companies 
     Company's strategy 8%
Description of principle products and services 7%
Technology and innovation, (R&D) 7%
Commitment to stakeholders, mission 6%
Company's investments (e.g. acquisitions) 6%
Number of shares held by management 6%
Environmental information 6%
Social information (health and safety, contributions) 6%
Management forecast or outlook 6%
Directors independence standards 6%
Economic sustainability information 5%
Historical segment data 5%
Company's broad goal or objectives 5%
List of major shareholders 4%
Age of executives and management 4%
Partners 3%
Debt information 3%
Stock repurchase information 3%
Industry specific information 3%
Historical financial statements 3%
Compensation of executives and management 3%
 Discription of the users of the products 2%
List of principle brands, registered trademarks 2%
New products 2%
Description of property, plants and equipment 2%
Management discussion of past financial data 1%
List of suppliers 1%
Distribution channels 1%
Manufacturing or service production 1%
 Directors compensation 1%
Transactions or/and relations among related parties 1%
Form 10K 97%
Form 10Q 96%
Archived SEC fillings 94%
Annual report 92%
 Form Section 16 or link to it 91%
News 87%
Ticker symbol 84%
Stock exchanges on which company is registered 83%
 Stock quotes 83%
Historical annual report 75%
Archived news 75%
Charts 73%
Calender of events 64%
General description of the companys' business 62%
Historical price lookup or link to it 58%
List of executives and management 58%
List of analysts 55%
List of Board of Directors members 55%
Conference calls 53%
Proxy statement 51%
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) 49%
Analysts' presentations 48%
Dividend information 45%
Financial highlights 40%
Experience of executives and management 40%
Income statement or hightlights 34%
Experience of Board of Directors members 34%
Important financial ratios 34%
Corporate governance guidelines 34%
Market capitalization 32%
Education of executives and management 32%
Earnings releases 31%
Balance sheet or highlightst 29%
Code of conduct and ethics 29%
Contact to analysts 29%
Quarterly report or quarterly financial statements 28%
Analysts' forecast estimates 28%
Cash flow statement or hightlights 27%
Link to SEC fillings 27%
Dividend history 27%
Other current jobs of Board of Directors members 27%
Number of shares held by institutions 26%
Historical quarterly report / financial statements 25%
Committees charter 24%
Archieved analysts' presentations 23%
Stock split information 23%
Committees information 23%
Insider transactions 22%
Archived conference calls 21%
Analysts' recommendations 20%
Historical earnings releases 19%
Education of Board of Directors members 18%
List of business units or organizationalal chart 17%
List of principle products and services 16%
Principle markets 15%
Company's history 14%
By-law 13%
Description of business units 12%
Data summary 12%
Segment data 12%
Age of Board of Directors members 12%
Certification of incorporation 10%
 Certification (CEO, CFO) 10%
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Table 7: Information items in order of percentage provided by large companies 
   Form 10K 97%
Form 10Q 96%
Annual report 94%
Archived SEC fillings 92%
 Form Section 16 or link to it 91%
News 90%
 Stock quotes 87%
Ticker symbol 86%
Historical annual report 82%
Stock exchanges on which company is registered 82%
Charts 79%
Archived news 74%
Calender of events 74%
Proxy statement 74%
Historical price lookup or link to it 67%
List of executives and management 60%
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) 59%
List of Board of Directors members 59%
General description of the companys' business 56%
Analysts' presentations 56%
Dividend information 53%
Corporate governance guidelines 51%
Dividend history 47%
List of analysts 47%
Earnings releases 46%
Conference calls 46%
Financial highlights 45%
Code of conduct and ethics 44%
Stock split information 41%
Experience of executives and management 37%
Archieved analysts' presentations 36%
Committees charter 36%
Quarterly report or quarterly financial statements 35%
Income statement or hightlights 33%
Experience of Board of Directors members 33%
Other current jobs of Board of Directors members 33%
Education of executives and management 32%
Committees information 32%
Historical quarterly report / financial statements 29%
Link to SEC fillings 28%
Balance sheet or highlightst 27%
Important financial ratios 27%
Historical earnings releases 24%
Cash flow statement or hightlights 24%
Analysts' forecast estimates 24%
Market capitalization 24%
Company's history 23%
List of business units or organizationalal chart 23%
By-law 23%
Archived conference calls 21%
Number of shares held by institutions 21%
Age of Board of Directors members 21%
Segment data 19%
Contact to analysts 19%
Certification of incorporation 19%
List of principle products and services 18%
Principle markets 18%
Analysts' recommendations 17%
Insider transactions 17%
Description of business units 15%
 Certification (CEO, CFO) 15%
Education of Board of Directors members 14%
Data summary 13%
Company's strategy 12%
Description of principle products and services 12%
Environmental information 12%
Social information (health and safety, contributions) 12%
Technology and innovation, (R&D) 10%
Economic sustainability information 10%
Management forecast or outlook 9%
Historical segment data 8%
Company's investments (e.g. acquisitions) 8%
Directors independence standards 8%
Commitment to stakeholders, mission 6%
Debt information 6%
Age of executives and management 6%
Company's broad goal or objectives 5%
Industry specific information 5%
Historical financial statements 5%
 Discription of the users of the products 4%
List of principle brands, registered trademarks 4%
New products 4%
Partners 4%
Stock repurchase information 4%
List of major shareholders 4%
Description of property, plants and equipment 3%
Number of shares held by management 3%
Management discussion of past financial data 3%
Compensation of executives and management 3%
List of suppliers 1%
Distribution channels 1%
Manufacturing or service production 1%
 Directors compensation 1%
Transactions or/and relations among related parties 1%
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Table 8: Information items in order of percentage provided by small companies 
  Form 10K 97%
Form 10Q 96%
Archived SEC fillings 95%
Annual report 91%
 Form Section 16 or link to it 91%
News 84%
Stock exchanges on which company is registered 84%
Ticker symbol 82%
 Stock quotes 79%
Archived news 75%
General description of the companys' business 68%
Historical annual report 68%
Charts 67%
List of analysts 63%
Conference calls 61%
List of executives and management 55%
Calender of events 53%
List of Board of Directors members 50%
Historical price lookup or link to it 49%
Experience of executives and management 42%
Important financial ratios 41%
Market capitalization 41%
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) 39%
Analysts' presentations 39%
Contact to analysts 38%
Dividend information 37%
Income statement or hightlights 36%
Financial highlights 36%
Experience of Board of Directors members 36%
Education of executives and management 33%
Balance sheet or highlightst 32%
Analysts' forecast estimates 32%
Number of shares held by institutions 32%
Cash flow statement or hightlights 30%
Insider transactions 28%
Link to SEC fillings 26%
Proxy statement 26%
Analysts' recommendations 24%
Archived conference calls 22%
Education of Board of Directors members 22%
Quarterly report or quarterly financial statements 21%
Other current jobs of Board of Directors members 21%
Historical quarterly report / financial statements 20%
Earnings releases 16%
Corporate governance guidelines 16%
Historical earnings releases 14%
Committees information 14%
Code of conduct and ethics 14%
List of principle products and services 13%
Principle markets 12%
Data summary 12%
Committees charter 12%
List of business units or organizationalal chart 11%
Archieved analysts' presentations 11%
Number of shares held by management 11%
Description of business units 9%
Commitment to stakeholders, mission 7%
Dividend history 7%
Company's strategy 5%
Segment data 5%
Company's investments (e.g. acquisitions) 5%
Stock split information 5%
Company's history 4%
Company's broad goal or objectives 4%
Technology and innovation, (R&D) 4%
List of major shareholders 4%
Directors independence standards 4%
 Certification (CEO, CFO) 4%
Description of principle products and services 3%
Partners 3%
Historical segment data 3%
Stock repurchase information 3%
Management forecast or outlook 3%
Compensation of executives and management 3%
Age of Board of Directors members 3%
By-law 3%
Description of property, plants and equipment 1%
Age of executives and management 1%
Certification of incorporation 1%
Industry specific information 0%
 Discription of the users of the products 0%
List of principle brands, registered trademarks 0%
New products 0%
List of suppliers 0%
Distribution channels 0%
Manufacturing or service production 0%
Economic sustainability information 0%
Environmental information 0%
Social information (health and safety, contributions) 0%
Historical financial statements 0%
Debt information 0%
Management discussion of past financial data 0%
 Directors compensation 0%
Transactions or/and relations among related parties 0%
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APPENDIX FOR THE INVESTOR RELATION INTERNET DISCLOSURE LEVEL 
AND THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL STUDY 
 
Table 9: Companies included in the sample  
 
Panel A: Summary of Sample Selection Process 
Number Percent
Total Firms at the beginning 160 100%
Firms for which disclosure score could not be calculated -6 3.75%
Firms for which the costs of capital could not be calculated -13 8.13%
Total of Firms Researched in the Study 141 88.13%
 
 
Panel B: Number of Companies in Relation to Size and Industry Membership 
                 Large Small Total
Healthcare 20 19 39
Industrial Goods and Services 20 18 38
Consumers 18 15 33
Information Technology 16 15 31
All Companies 74 67 141
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics for sample firms 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Percentile Standard
Variable n Mean 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% Deviation
Size:
MVAL 141 20077 513 810 5565 19786 223154 42559
SALES 141 12489 458 873 4356 13829 149826 25636
Risk:
BETA 141 0.828 -0.121 0.450 0.712 1.104 2.313 0.544
BVDMVE 141 0.339 0.000 0.062 0.181 0.400 3.530 0.605
CR 141 1.549 0.000 0.900 1.410 2.120 3.380 0.898
PER 141 19.719 8.784 13.815 16.754 21.896 51.345 10.019
Disclosure:
ANALYSTS 141 14 2 7 12 18 35 8
INTDISC 141 27 7 20 28 34 50 10
INTDISC1 141 5 0 3 4 6 16 3
INTDISC2 141 18 5 13 17 22 29 6
INTDISC3 141 5 0 1 4 8 14 4
Implied 
cost of capital:
IDR 141 12.48% 8.42% 10.82% 12.31% 13.82% 17.95% 6.77%
 
For variable description and measurement, see pages 91-92 
 
 
Panel B: Sample of Large Companies  
Percentile Standard
Variable n Mean 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% Deviation
Size:
MVAL 74 37,480 5095 9418 18953 30854 274197 53174
SALES 74 22,958 3178 7814 12673 22602 168426 32038
Risk:
BETA 74 0.831 -0.042 0.465 0.767 1.079 2.245 0.503
BVDMVE 74 0.456 0.001 0.083 0.211 0.403 6.362 1.060
CR 74 1.261 0.000 0.775 1.205 1.548 3.445 0.808
PER 74 20.064 8.784 14.178 17.467 22.053 51.345 9.980
Disclosure:
ANALYSTS 74 19 6 14 18 25 37 7
INTDISC 74 30 10 24 30 36 53 10
Implied 
cost of capital:
IDR 74 12.06% 8.00% 10.44% 12.05% 13.15% 17.32% 2.27%
 
For variable description and measurement, see pages 91-92 
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Panel C: Sample of Small Companies  
 
Percentile Standard
Variable n Mean 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% Deviation
Size:
MVAL 67 856 503 651 802 921 1683 300
SALES 67 925 450 606 830 1185 1683 358
Risk:
BETA 67 0.832 -0.100 0.455 0.681 1.207 2.471 0.584
BVDMVE 67 0.266 0.000 0.020 0.168 0.351 1.564 0.330
CR 67 1.921 0.000 1.150 1.820 2.525 4.965 1.046
PER 67 19.338 8.784 13.392 15.771 21.750 51.345 10.124
Disclosure:
ANALYSTS 67 7 2 4 7 10 18 4
INTDISC 67 24 7 17 24 32 40 9
Implied 
cost of capital:
IDR 67 12.93% 9.05% 11.39% 12.75% 14.15% 18.42% 2.16%
 
For variable description and measurement, see pages 91-92 
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Table 11: Descriptive statistic for disclosure scores  
 
Percentile Standard
Variable n Mean Min 25% 50% 75% Max Deviation
Full Sample
INTDISC 141 27.29 6 20 28 34 56 10.39
INTDISC1 141 4.76 0 3 4 6 19 3.08
INTDISC2 141 17.51 4 13 17 22 30 5.99
INTDISC3 141 5.02 0 1 4 8 15 4.11
Large Companies
INTDISC 74 30.30 10 24 30 36 56 10.49
Small Companies
INTDISC 67 23.97 6 17 24 32 45 9.27
Industries
INTDISCH 39 29.00 7 22 29 36 48 11.15
INTDISCI 38 24.92 6 16 25 32 52 10.67
INTDISCC 33 30.24 11 26 30 35 56 9.92
INTDISCIT 31 24.90 9 20 25 30 46 8.63
 
For variable description and measurement, see pages 91-92 
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Table 12: Descriptive statistic for the implied cost of capital 
 
Percentile Standard
Variable n Mean 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% Deviation
Full Sample
IDR 141 12.48% 8.42% 10.82% 12.31% 13.82% 17.95% 2.25%
Large Companies
IDR 74 12.06% 8.00% 10.44% 12.05% 13.15% 17.32% 2.27%
Small Companies
IDR 67 12.93% 9.05% 11.39% 12.75% 14.15% 18.42% 2.16%
Industries
IDRH 39 12.66% 9.30% 11.10% 12.85% 13.87% 16.01% 1.86%
IDRI 38 11.76% 7.62% 10.12% 11.67% 13.31% 16.67% 2.29%
IDRC 33 13.11% 9.51% 11.34% 12.58% 14.71% 18.53% 2.39%
IDRIT 31 12.44% 8.70% 10.84% 12.31% 13.46% 17.26% 2.38%
 
For variable description and measurement, see pages 91-92 
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Table 13: Validity of the disclosure score 
 
Panel A: Pearson Correlation Coefficient for Disclosure Score and Firm Characteristics related to 
Disclosure 
 
INTDISC MVAL ROE VOLUME ANALYST
INTDISC 1 0.370 0.191 0.340 0.314
MVAL 0.370 1 0.162 0.709 0.812
ROE 0.191 0.162 1 0.113 0.162
VOLUME 0.340 0.709 0.113 1 0.636
ANALYST 0.314 0.812 0.162 0.636 1
 
For variable description and measurement, see pages 91-92 
 
 
 
Panel B: Disclosure Rank and Firm Characteristics related to Disclosure 
 
Intercept MVAL ROE Adj. RSQ
(-) (-)
Panel A: Simple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 135.944 -18.295 0.114
P-Value 0.000 0.000
Coefficient 78.925 -46.812 0.047
P-Value 0.000 0.006
Panel B: Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 137.951 -16.757 -36.443 0.140
P-Value 0.000 0.000 0.025
***  
***  **
***  
 
For variable description and measurement, see pages 91-92 
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Table 14: An overview of the FCFE model 
∑ ∑∑
+= +== +
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
=
N
nt
M
Nt
t
t
t
t
n
t
t
t
k
FCFE
k
FCFE
k
FCFE
k
FCFE
k
FCFEP
1 13
2
21
0 )1()1()1()1()1(  
FCFE  
1 
 
FCFE
3 
FCFE
2 
FCFE
n 
Indirect Forecast Direct Forecast 
FCFE
n+1 
FCFE
n+2 
FCFE
n+3 
Fading Growth Stage 
FCFE
N 
FCFE
N+1 
FCFE 
M 
Stable Growth Stage 
FCFE = 
Net income 
+D&A*(1-DFP) 
-Capex*(1-DFP) 
+/- change in 
working capital*(1-
DFP) 
 
Growth Rate: 
- Analyst growth 
rate of earnings 
- Historical 
extrapolation for 
other components 
of FCFE 
Given FCFE and the current market price we 
solve for the market implied discount rate using 
the Excel solver 
Discounted at cost of equity capital 
FCFE growth rate = 
Average of long-term 
nominal GDP growth rate 
and long term corporate 
profit growth rate 
Sum of all 
discounted 
FCFE = 
market price 
of the stock 
Linear fading over N-n years: 
- Min 4 years 
- Max 10 years 
- Depending on 
fundamental growth 
duration 
Fundamental Growth 
Duration (GD): 
- Market based GD 
- Price implied GD 
- Economical GD 
approach 
 
…. …. …. 
Maximum number 
of years is 175 
(proxy for infinity) 
FCFE
N+2 
Stage One Stage Two Stage Three 
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Table 15: Validity of the implied cost of capital: Pearson correlation coefficients for the implied 
cost of capital and firm characteristics related to the cost of capital 
 
IDR MVAL BVDMVE CR PER BVDBVE INDUM BETA VOLUME ANALYST
IDR 1 -0.263 0.173 -0.173 -0.258 0.149 0.131 -0.034 -0.174 -0.236
MVAL -0.263 1 0.049 -0.287 0.089 0.087 0.019 0.029 0.709 0.812
BVDMVE 0.173 0.049 1 -0.275 -0.115 0.908 0.031 0.133 0.132 -0.036
CR -0.173 -0.287 -0.275 1 0.357 -0.305 0.071 0.134 -0.095 -0.210
PER -0.258 0.089 -0.115 0.357 1 -0.063 0.215 0.422 0.232 0.210
BVDBVE 0.149 0.087 0.908 -0.305 -0.063 1 0.067 0.124 0.159 -0.002
INDUM 0.131 0.019 0.031 0.071 0.215 0.067 1 0.451 0.157 0.203
BETA -0.034 0.029 0.133 0.134 0.422 0.124 0.451 1 0.245 0.070
VOLUME -0.174 0.709 0.132 -0.095 0.232 0.159 0.157 0.245 1 0.636
ANALYST -0.236 0.812 -0.036 -0.210 0.210 -0.002 0.203 0.070 0.636 1
 
For variable description and measurement, see pages 91-92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 113 
Table 16: Regression results of implied cost of capital on market value, beta and disclosure 
score (sub-sample of large companies; excluding auto) 
 
Intercept INTDISC MVAL BETA Adj. RSQ
(-) (-) (+)
Simple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.090870493 -0.000564122 0.061185
P-Value 2.10447E-18 0.021192055
Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.090220838 -0.00053549 -1.93317E-08 0.000647 0.035559
P-Value 7.03658E-16 0.039878415 0.698449872 0.898133
**
**
 
For variable description and measurement, see pages 91-92 
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Table 17: Regression results of implied cost of capital on market value, beta and disclosure 
score (sub-sample of small companies; excluding industrial goods and services) 
 
Intercept INTDISC MVAL BETA Adj. RSQ
(-) (-) (+)
Simple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.103888601 -0.000697327 0.073366
P-Value 3.52097E-16 0.033446146
Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.1226949 -0.00057702 -1.95399E-05 -0.004804 0.147445
P-Value 2.56704E-14 0.068616933 0.028215989 0.295838
**
*
 
For variable description and measurement, see pages 91-92 
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Table 18: Specification tests for the full sample 
 
Panel A: Regression of Implied Cost of Capital on Market Value, Leverage, Price-to-Earnings ratio 
and Disclosure Score 
 
Intercept MVAL BVDMVE PER INTDISC Adj. RSQ
(-) (+) (-) (-)
Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.09139 -5.31798E-08 0.00618 -0.00047 0.08171
P-Value 0.00000 0.24395 0.04310 0.01235
Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.10381 -5.49742E-08 -0.00055 -0.00045 0.11509
P-Value 0.00000 0.21933 0.00249 0.01506
** **
* **
***
 
 
 
Panel B: Regression of Implied Cost of Capital on Market Value, Beta, Industry Membership and 
Disclosure Score 
 
Intercept MVAL BETA INDUM INTDISC Adj. RSQ
(-) (+) (+) (-)
Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.04818 -4.97122E-08 -0.00213 0.60461 -0.00046 0.06842
P-Value 0.07118 0.28158 0.54712 0.07940 0.01643 ***
 
 
 
Panel C: Regression of Implied Cost of Capital on Market Value, Beta, Return on Equity and 
Disclosure Score 
 
Intercept MVAL BETA ROE INTDISC Adj. RSQ
(-) (+) (-) (-)
Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.0939 -5.89E-08 -0.0006 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0470
P-Value 0.0000 0.2064 0.8608 0.9591 0.0168 ***
 
 
 
 
 
         Continued next page 
 116
Panel D: Regression of Implied Cost of Capital on Market Value, Beta and Disclosure Rank 
(INTDISCRANK) 
 
Intercept MVAL BETA INTDISC Adj. RSQ
RANK
(-) (+) (-)
Simple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.0694 0.0001 0.0646
P-Value 0.0000 0.0014
Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.0724 -6.05E-08 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0711
P-Value 0.0000 0.1827 0.8507 0.0072
***
* ***
 
 
 
Panel E: Regression of Implied Cost of Capital on Market Value, Price-to-Earnings Ratio, Beta and 
INTDISCMOD 
 
Intercept MVAL BETA PER INTDISC Adj. RSQ
MOD
(-) (+) (-) (-)
Simple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.08502 -0.01029 0.04537
P-Value 0.00000 0.00644
Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.08846 -1.0299E-07 -0.00131 -0.01080 0.07111
P-Value 0.00000 0.01861 0.69985 0.00386
Multiple Regression (OLS)
Coefficient 0.09732 -9.17785E-08 -0.00050 -0.01128 0.12063
P-Value 0.00000 0.03162 0.00575 0.00200
***
***
*****
**
***
 
 
For variable description and measurement, see pages 91-92 
 
 
